Tuesday, 5 January 2016

Review petition by Adv.R.P.Luthra sekking review of order on the Blog of J.(Rtd.)M. Katju

BETWEEN                               
R.P.Luthra.                               …PETITIONER
AND
CBI & Ors.                                    …RESPONDENTS 


PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 137 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA SEEKING REVIEW OF THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 23.11.2015 PASSED BY THIS HON’BLE COURT IN SLP (Crl) NO.8687 of 2014. 

TO
THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA
AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE
HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

THE HUMBLE PETITION OF PETITIONER ABOVE NAMED

MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH
1.   The Petitioner above named respectfully submits this Petition seeking review of the judgment and order dated 23.11.2015 passed by this Hon’ble Court in S.L.P. (Crl) No.8687/2015.
2.      The Review Petitioner is a citizen of India and has been practicing as a lawyer for the last 25 years.  He was Petitioner in S.L.P. No.8787 of 2015, which was disposed of without being admitted.
3.      Though it is said that iura novit curia – the Court knows the laws – and there is no need to plead law, it has become imperative to briefly delve into the concept of review, for there can be no other concept which is more misunderstood than the concept of review as known in common law, which stands embodied in Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), nay, the concept of judicial review or the concept of appeal.  It is a fundamental principle of law that a Court or Tribunal duly constituted acting within the jurisdiction invested in it, does not fail to exercise its jurisdiction or does not act in excess of its jurisdiction or acts in conformity with the principles of natural justice and not in violation of the express statutory provisions or in ignorance thereof, can bind the parties to a dispute by its decision, whether it decides rightly or wrongly, and its decision constitutes to be res judicata estoppel.  Stated still simply, the concept of rule of law is founded on the principle that a Court or Tribunal acting as aforesaid can bind the parties to a dispute even by an erroneous decision which constitutes to be res judicata,  and unless the statute provides for an appeal, a mechanism for correction of the decision, howsoever grave may be the error committed by the Court or Tribunal and the injury resulting therefrom the party aggrieved by the judgment, order or decree has to suffer, for jurisdiction means jurisdiction to bind a party to the dispute even by an erroneous decision.  That is the substance of the concept of res judicata estoppel.  The reason behind the concept of res judicata estoppel is interesto republico ut  sit finis  litium – it is in the interest of the State that there be an end to litigation – and nemo debet bis vexari pro uno et eadem causa – “no individual should be sued more than once for the same cause”.

4.      While a judicial decision, be it right or wrong, is final and binding and constitutes to be res judicata estoppel, there is an exception to the said rule.  The doctrine of res judicata applies only if the judgment, decree or order of a Court or Tribunal is not vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record.  “Errors apparent on the face of the record”, contrary to the common misconception, are errors of law and not of fact or even mixed question of fact and law.  Where a judgment, decree or order of a Court or Tribunal is vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record, namely, where the a Court or Tribunal has acted beyond its jurisdiction, nay, where it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, nay, where the Court or Tribunal has failed to hear the parties to the dispute or has failed to observe the principles of natural justice or where it has acted in ignorance or violation of express statutory provisions, the judgment, decree or order so passed constitutes to be no res judicata estoppel.  On the other hand, such judgment, decree or order is null and void ab initio, which never ever existed in the eye of law, stillborn and non est in law.

5.                       The judgment, decree or order of a Court or Tribunal, which was rendered without the important matter or evidence which had a bearing on the controversy under adjudication, is no judgment, decree or order in the eye of law and such a judgment, decree or order constitutes no res judicata estoppel, it being rendered without the relevant evidence before it.

6.   Stated in brief, the doctrine of res judicata has two exceptions, namely, (a) where a judgment, decree or order or a Court or Tribunal is vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record ad where the error made is a legal error and where the error means only an error of law, not on fact, and (b) where a judgment on facts, which does not constitute res judicata, for the important matter or evidence which was essential for adjudication of the dispute, was not before the Court and the party has suffered a judgment is guilty of no lapses or negligence because such material or evidence was discovered subsequent to the decree and was not within his knowledge and even where he had exercised all diligence could not have produced it before the Court.  The relief of declaration of nullity, which the Review Petitioner seeks through the procedural remedy of recall/review, has to be judged from the grounds on which the review could be sought as detailed above.

7.    The appellant is before this court, just because the question of law which he raised remains to be unanswered and is still res-integra. None of the question of law, as raised by the appellant was answered by the High Court in it's judgment, even though the judgment apparently is a speaking one. The unfortunate part is that the appeal on the same judgment, being the impugned one in the instant SLP is dismissed, without any elucidation and the question of law still remains to be unanswered.
8.  A 'speaking order' is all the more necessary in the given case  because the matter involved is the corruption at high places and certainly about the judiciary as well,  and  further, because the decision, affecting the reputation dignity and majesty of the judiciary being a sacrosanct institution, is given in a summary manner without a hearing being allowed to the parties.     A  party  is entitled to  know  why  the decision has gone against him.  It goes without saying that petitioner is placed under a great disadvantage if no reasons are given and the SLP is dismissed curtly by the use of the single phrase : “Heard the petitioner appearing in-person. Since we find no infirmity in the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, we are not inclined to exercise our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The special leave petition is dismissed accordingly". This will certainly be a very unsatisfactory method of dealing with the appeal/SLP.  In such a case, this Court can probably only exercise it's revisional jurisdiction satisfactorily by examining the entire records of the case and after giving a hearing come to its conclusion on the merits of the appeal. Heard word is used in the judgment to indicate that the petitioner is heard by the bench of his arguments, based upon which the reasonings given to reach a particular conclusion, amounting to the decision of the court. Once none of the arguments or grounds argued by the petitioner is recorded, nor any reasoning given to substantiate the said conclusion, it amounts to a non speaking order, and resorting to such a non speaking order in a matter which is so important to the independence of the judiciary and its supremacy, which is the inalienable, transcendental, and primordial basic structure of the Constitution. Hence the use of terminology “Heard” is not substantiated by the order of this court dated 23/11/2015. The Order gives room for arbitrariness and bias which has creeped in even may be unconsciously. 
9. But, when the reasons given in the order of the High Court  are scrappy or nebulous and this Hon’ble Court makes no attempt to clarify the same, this Court, in revision may have to  examine the case de novo without anybody being the wiser for the review. If the Hon’ble High Court  gives a number of reasons some of which are good and some are not, and this Hon’ble Court  merely endorses the order of the High Court  without specifying those reasons which according to it are ,sufficient to uphold the order of the High Court, this Court, in revision, may find it difficult to ascertain which are the grounds which weighed with this Hon’ble Court  in upholding the order of the High Court. In such circumstances, what is known as a "speaking order" is called for. The appellant fail to see how the power of this court can be effectively exercised under Article 136 of the Constitution if reasons are not given in support of its order.
10.   If Courts can make orders without giving reasons, the said power in the hands of unscrupulous or dishonest judges may turn out to be a potent weapon for abuse of power. But, if reasons for an order are given, it will be an effective restraint on such abuse, as the order, if it discloses extraneous or irrelevant considerations, will be subject to   correction. A speaking order will at its best be a reasonable and at its worst be at least a plausible one. The citizens of the nation should not be deprived of this ‘only’ safeguard. The petitioner relies upon the following decisions of this Hon’ble Court in this aspect:
a.       Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala, AIR 1961 SC 1669
b.      Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1606
c.       Siemens Engineering v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785
d.      Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India, 1978 ELT (J) 738
e.      Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1271
f.        Raipur Development Authority v. Chokhamal Contractors, AIR 1990 SC 1426
g.       S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984
h.      Bidhan Nagar Salt Welfare Association v. Central Valuation Board, (2007) 6 SCC 668
11.   Though the Code of Criminal Procedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed, in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution under which, if the High Court could be convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer mala fide, or not exercised at all,  the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer from misusing his legal powers or asking him to use his powers. This position has been made further clear by this Court in its authoritative pronouncement in State of Bihar & anr. Vs. J.A.C. Saldanha & ors. Thus:
“There is a clear-cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department the superintendence over which vests in the State Government. The executive which is charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order situation is obliged to prevent crime and if an offence is alleged to have been committed it is its bounden duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offender to book. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. Once that is completed and the investigating officer submits report to the Court requesting the Court to take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 of the Code its duty comes to an end. On a cognizance of the offence being taken by the Court the police function of investigation comes to an end subject to the provision contained in Section 173(8), there commences the adjudicatory function of the judiciary to determine whether an offence has been committed and if so, whether by the person or persons charged with the crime by the police in its report to the Court, and to award adequate punishment according to law for the offence proved to the satisfaction of the Court. There is thus a well defined and well demarcated function in the field of crime detection and it's subsequent adjudication between the police and the Magistrate. This has been recognised way back in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad. This view of the Judicial Committee clearly demarcates the functions of the executive and the judiciary in the field of detection of crime and its subsequent trial and it would appear that the power of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence is ordinarily not to be interfered with by the judiciary.”

12.  In Secretary, Minor Irrigation & Rural Engineering Services, U.P. and Ors. Vs. Sahngoo Ram Arya and Anr. , this Hon’ble  Court took the view that a decision to direct an enquiry against a person can be done if the High Court after considering the material on record comes to a conclusion that such material does disclose a prima facie case calling for an investigation by an Investigating Agency. This Hon’ble  Court relying upon its earlier decision in Common Cause, A Registered Society Vs. Union of India & ors. held that a direction for investigation can be given, if an offence is, prima facie, found to have been committed or a person’s involvement is prima facie established.
13.  In State of West Bengal & ors. Vs. Sampat Lal & Ors. , this Hon’ble Court held that the Courts should be prima facie satisfied that the information laid before it is of such a nature that it calls for examination and this prima facie satisfaction may be derived from the credentials of the informant, namely, what is the character or standing of the informant or from the nature of the information given by him, namely, whether it is vague and indefinite or contains specific allegations as a result of survey or investigation or from the gravity or seriousness of the complaint set out in the information or from any other circumstance or circumstances appearing from the communication addressed to the court or to a Judge of the court on behalf of the court. In the instant case, all the above conditions are positively met. The credentials of the informant is beyond any doubt. He is the retired judge of this Hon’ble Court.
14.  The established law is that if any cognizable offence is brought to the notice of a magistrate or any competent authority, then an investigation shall be carried out to confirm the veracity of the same and to proceed in accordance with law. It is the very essence of criminal inquiry. Even a discloser statement by the accused in police custody, which is inadmissible evidence, but a valid statement for bringing the investigating agency into motion. In the present case it is not only the information which disclose the commission of the cognizable offence, but also supported by the extra judicial confession, which, is sufficient to make the investigation agency to find out the veracity of the same. Hence the Hon’ble High Court as well as this Hon’ble Court ought to have considered as sufficient material to direct the respondent to investigate to reach to the conclusion about the falsity or the truthfulness of the information and further to proceed with in accordance with law.  Even if the allegations are against the persons of high offices, there are twin objective to achieve that the concerned person is not under the shadow of allegations, which is essential to upkeep the dignity of the office he is holding. In contrast to that if there is an element of truth exist in the given allegations, then there is a necessity to keep the institution clean and fair and keep it's dignity high, by replacing the corrupt person with a genuine person with impeccable integrity.  In either way the very essence of investigation and inquiry in to any allegations of corruption or malpractices with respect to any high office is raised is to protect the dignity and esteem of the  said office before the public at large. Whereas while dismissing the writ petition by the High Court, this cardinal principle is forgotten and the allegations of cognizable offence is left without any further investigations being made, making serious dent to the image of the judiciary as a whole. It is the duty of the high court to upkeep the dignity majesty of the judiciary by way of clearing the air of clouds surrounded it by the allegations of corruption by causing an investigation. But the high court by the impugned judgment failed miserably to discharge it's duty to the nation as a whole to make in house cleaning. What the high court has done through the impugned judgment is contrary to records and contrary to law as well. 
15.  The court is free to err in it's jurisdiction and can even hold that 2x2=6, but  if challenged shall be duty bound to give reasons. When the judgment fails to give reasonable explanation to such a proposition, the remedy available to the party aggrieved is to challenge it before the appellate authority, which this Hon’ble court in this case. This Court is also free to say that 2x2 is not 6, but 9. As long as this is within the jurisdiction of this Court the same is binding on the parties. But the Hon’ble Court is duty bound to reason it out. But the appeal before this Hon’ble Court under Article 136 of the Constitution failed to make any correction to such a magnificent failure at the hands of the Hon’ble High Court. This Hon’ble Court enjoys an appellate jurisdiction upon the judgments of the High Courts under Article 136 of the Constitution, which is not exercised by this Hon’ble Court while dismissing the appeal against the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court.
16.  The given matter of national importance, as the allegations of corruption and committing of crime which are cognizable offences involves both judiciary and political executive. The image and reputation of the highest court of the nation and especially the office of the Chief Justice of India are at stake and the same are sacrosanct and valuable to the nation as a whole. An investigation as prayed by the petitioner could have restored the damaged reputation and lost glory of this institution as a whole, and kept the interest of the nation above the narrow personal interests of some individuals. The intention of the petitioner is very evident from the prayer itself that the reputation of the institution shall be restored, by way of an investigation and bringing to book the criminals if any in accordance with law, or else to clear the clouds of doubts in the minds of the public at large.
17.  There are many judgments by this Hon’ble Courts which lays down the parameters of criminal investigation, especially when the higher offices of the Nation are involved.
18.      P.V. Narsimha Rao vs State (CBI/Spe) was a case in which the parliament members voted to save the government in a no confidence motion. The present disclosure amounts to the disclosure of other means and meddling with the independence and supremacy of judiciary to save another government.  What is elementarily required in the current situation is investigation and not justifications nor cover ups. Any amount and efforts of cover up can cause irreparable damage to the image and reputation of judiciary as a whole.  It is painful to the petitioner that even this highest court of country is abetting such a crime and trying to cover up the same without making an iota of effort to clean up the in house mess. There is a need to come out clean, spec and clear.  
19.      The petitioner is not going deep into the Coal scam judgments on investigations, the matter being not yet settled. But still the requirement of investigation into an allegation of misuse of powers is very foundation of it and the same ratio and principles are not applied in the instant case neither by the Hon’ble High Court or This Hon’ble Court, whereas the effort should have been exemplary to clean the in house mess of the judiciary.
20.      The disclosure through the given blog by a former judge of this Hon’ble Court  is an information in regard to the fact, which is supposed to be the subject matter of the investigation for the collection of evidence, and to be proved before the competent court based upon the evidences in support of it. The basic premise is that the facts are to be proved. The claim of the impugned judgment that the blog is only an opinion is contrary to reason. There are a series of quotations from various dictionaries, searching out the meaning of the terminology “BLOG” and the court came to a unreasonable conclusion which leads to absurdity that  it is only an opinion. Whereas the given quoted meaning of the dictionaries evidently and repeatedly establishes that the same can be an experience as well, which is most conveniently ignored by the Hon’ble High Court leading to the absurd conclusion. Revelation of the commission of an offence, which is a cognizable offence cannot be ignored under the premise that the same is only an opinion. The se re not the opinion only, but the admitted facts in the case of Shanti Bhushan and anr. Vs.Union of India and anr. (2009) 1 SCC 657. An opinion is a view or outlook by the individual on a fact. But the disclosure of the fact itself is not an opinion and especially when it amounts to disclosure of a cognizable offence. Disclosure of a cognizable offence, in whatever means is a fact, which needs to be proved of it's veracity by way of an investigation. The mode of disclosure is not a reason to declare it as an opinion. In other words, the mode of disclosure is not the foundation of deciding the same as opinion, but the establishment of the cognizable offence by way of disclosure amounts to the fact which needs to be proved. In that way, the impugned judgment is contrary to the reason and law.  The dictionary meaning of experience for the term ‘BLOG’ is conveniently shadowed in the reasoning given to establish it as an opinion making it a colourable judgment. The unfortunate thing is that this Hon’ble Court also endorsed the same view, without resorting to correct the error committed by the Hon’ble High Court, by dismissing the SLP, even without recording any reasons. The order tantamount to supporting the judges, who are not having basic knowledge in jurisprudence or is hand in glue with the corruption and criminal activities.
21.      Even when the order says that the party in person is ‘heard’ none of his arguments are forming the part of  the order, and hence the usage of the term ‘Heard’ is without any manifestation of fairness. Once the Court hears the parties, the very essence of hearing shall be made part of the record, so that the judgment/order forms a speaking order. Once none of the contentions are recorded, and reasoning not given for rejecting it, the terminology used as ‘ heard’ is  not in accordance with equity, justice and good conscious. As the order dismissing the SLP is not disclosing any averments or arguments of the party in person or the reasons to dismiss the same, even when the issues raised in the said SLP is of National importance amounts to travesty of justice and hence amounts to sham. The fact remains that no amount of cake can convert a piece of cow dung into a cake! No amount of silence can conceal the dirt sticking into this holy institution which so indispensable for the sustenance of democracy of the Nation.  
22.      Once the commission of a cognizable offence is disclosed, the very premise is that it to be inquired by the competent agency and dealt with in accordance with law for the time being in force.
23.      Only the President of India and the Governors of the state are exempted from criminal prosecution, by virtue of legal protection. But still they are not protected by virtue of such an immunity. It’s only a protection from undue harassment or to protect the individual being done something with bone fide intentions cannot be harassed unduly.  But the fact remains that even the said individual are not protected for their malafide actions, and criminal conduct, if any, they have committed.  The impeachment proceedings and subsequent criminal proceedings can be a prudent course of action in case of president and in case of the Governor, removal by the President.  But this impugned judgment gives unlawful protection to the persons involved in the corruption, may be because the names of judges are also involved in the same. The question then arises is that, ‘are the judges above the law?’. The law of equity says, as Lord Denning quoted in 20th Century,  that ‘let you of any high, the law is above you’. Whereas the impugned judgment places the class of judges as persons above law, who cannot be inquired into even if cognizable offence is alleged to be committed by them. It gives the judges of the Indian Judiciary a divine authority that their actions, even though however criminal or illegal it is shall not be inquired into or put to the mechanism of law. They are par above law, as the impugned judgment establishes and endorsed by this hon’ble court by a single syllable judgment.
24.      Whereas, saving or protecting an offender is an offence in itself amounting to abetting. The impugned judgment when amounted to such an abetting of offence, the last resort was this Hon’ble Court, under Article 136 of the Constitution, whereas this Hon’ble court also miserably failed the Constitution and Criminal Procedure Code, inter alia defeating the nation itself. 
25.      The gist of the allegations in the writ petitions is that Government agencies like the CBI and the revenue authorities had failed to perform their duties and legal obligations inasmuch as they had failed to investigate matters arising out of the blog by the former Judge of this Hon’ble Court ; that the allegations of illegal gratification and political pressure  by clandestine and illegal means using political muscle flexing; that this had also disclosed a nexus between politicians, judges and criminals, who were  hand in glove in  unlawful means, given for unlawful consideration that the CBI and other Government agencies had failed to investigate the matter, take it to its logical conclusion and prosecute all persons who were found to have committed an offence; that this was done with a view to protect the persons involved, who were very influential and powerful; that the matter disclosed a nexus between crime and corruption at high places in public life and it posed a serious threat to the integrity, security and economy of the nation; that probity in public life, the rule of law and the preservation of democracy required that the Government agencies be compelled to duly perform their legal obligations and to proceed in accordance with law against every person involved, irrespective of where he was placed in the political judicial hierarchy. The writ petitions prayed, inter alia, for the said reliefs.
26.      The sum and substance of these prayers is that the CBI and other Governmental agencies had not carried out their public duty to investigate the offences disclosed; that none stands above the law so that an alleged offence by him is not required to be investigated . Having regard to the direction in which the investigations were not initiated, the petitioner finds it necessary to direct the CBI  to investigate the alleged commission of cognizable offences and crimes to eliminate any impression of bias or lack of fairness or objectivity and to maintain the credibility of the investigations.
27.       The impugned judgment is founded upon the decision of this Hon’ble Court in Shantibhushan Vs. UOI which is totally upon a different footing and in no way answering any of the questions raised by the petitioner. Application of the said ratio on a totally unintended context make the impugned judgment per incurium. The quoted judgment itself is founded upon a wrong footing to the extent that the wrong appointment is allowed to continue  on the ground that only two months are left for the retirement of the concerned judge, and no further investigation is required. The said premise and ratio also leads to absurd premise that the criminal can be let off the legal consequences based upon the time factor. It amounts to accepting the preposition that the commission of crime is not the basis of prosecution, but other extraneous considerations. Or else the concept of rule of law is not applicable to the judges and judiciary.  amounting to Res-integra and not a Res-judicata or precedent.
28.      The petitioner is asking a question to himself, is the judiciary not going to take any action against the corrupt judges, who has committed even cognizable offences or crimes? The intention of the petitioner is simple that such a wrong precedent cannot go on record, giving an undue protection to the judges, making them capable of causing gross abuse of the powers invested in them, without any checks and balances.  The petitioner raises the doubt that the judges are humans or of divine authority as such?  Are they above law or law unto themselves?  Does it mean that the judiciary is not having faith in it's own system, as the judges are reluctant to face the courts and clear their names when controversies or allegations of corruption and crimes emerges? How can it expect the people at large can have faith in it?
29.      The protection of corruption given to the judges and the members of judiciary is condemning the Citizen’s rights and interalia, disrespecting the constitution who are duty bound to protect the constitution and the rights of the citizens. The petitioner intend to make an end to the corruption in the judiciary which makes the poor man being left with no remedy.  If the persons holding the office of the highest judiciary has no respect of law and further protect and hide the corrupt and their practices, it amounts to the violation of the oath of  office and stands against the constitutional ethos.
30.      Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. The present powers as enjoyed by the judges and judiciary are unfettered, tyrannical and unaccountable creating an opaque system.  The effort of the petitioner is to throw some light into the dark trenches of power. 
31.      In the issue of Jain Hawala case (Vineet Narain & Others vs Union Of India & Another on 18 December, 1997) this Hon’ble Court held as follows:
The It is alleged that the apprehending of certain terrorists led to the discovery of financial support to them by clandestine and illegal means, by use of tainted funds obtained through 'havala' transactions; that this also disclosed a nexus between several important politicians, bureaucrats and criminals, who are all recipients of money from unlawful sources given for unlawful considerations; that the CBI and other Government agencies have failed to fully investigate into the matter and take it to the logical end point of the trail and to prosecute all persons who have committed any crime; that this is being done with a view to protect the persons involved, who are very influential and powerful in the present set up; that the matter discloses a definite nexus between crime and corruption in public life at high places in the country which poses a serious threat to the integrity, security and economy of the nation; that probity in public life, to prevent erosion of the rule of law and the preservation of democracy in the country, requires that the Government agencies be compelled to duly perform their legal obligations and to person in accordance with law against cach and every person involved, irrespective of the height at which he is placed in the power set up. The facts and circumstances of the present case do indicate that it is of utmost public importance that this matter is examined thoroughly by this Court to ensure that all Government agencies, entrusted with the duty to discharge their functions and obligations in accordance with law, do so, bearing in mind constantly the concept of equality enshrined in the Constitution and the basic tenet of rule of law: "Be you ever so high, the law is above you".
Investigation into accusation made against each and every person on a reasonable basis, irrespective of the position and status of that person, must be conducted and completed expeditiously. This is imperative to retain public confidence in the impartial working of the Government agencies. In this proceeding we are not concerned with the merits of the accusations or the individuals alleged to be involved, but only with the performance of the legal duty by the Government agencies to fairly, properly and fully investigate into every such accusation against every person, and to take the logical final action in accordance with law. In case of persons against whom a prima facie case is made out and a charge sheet is filed in the competent court, it is that court which will then deal with that case on merits, in accordance with law. However, if in respect of any such person the final report after full investigation is that no prima facic case is made out to proceed further, so that the case must be closed against him, that report must be promptly submitted to this Court for it's satisfaction that the concerned authorities have not failed to perform their legal obligations and have reasonably come to such conclusion. No such report having been submitted by the CBI or any other agency till now in this Court, action on such a report by this Court would be considered, if and when that occasion arises. We also direct that no settlement should be arrived at nor any offence compounded by any authority without prior leave of this Court. We may add that on account of the great public interest involved in this matter, the CBI and other Government agencies must expedite their action to complete the task and prevent pendency of this matter beyond the period necessary. It is needless to observe that the results achieved so far do not match the available time and opportunity for a full investigation ever since the matter came to light. It is of utmost national significance that no further time is lost in completion of the task. "
32.         The judiciary is always in the forefront to preach propriety in the public offices when it comes to executive and political authorites. There are catena judgments which declare that the holders of public offices, like ceasor’s wife shall be above suspicion. Once it is not applicable to the judiciary, it remains to be the chastity preaching of the prostitute.
33.          The words of Jesus Christ “Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye”  is as applicable to even the judges of the Highest  Court of the land as well, in the present context. The petitioner relays on the judgment of this Hon’ble Court dated 10.12.2015 on the Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and Ors. in which it is quoted as “Corruption, a 'noun' when assumes all the characteristics of a Verb', becomes self-infective and also develops resistance to antibiotics. In such a situation the disguised protagonist never puts a Hamletian question-"to be or not to be"-but marches ahead with perverted proclivity-sans concern, sans care for collective interest, and irrefragably without conscience. In a way, corruption becomes a national economic terror. This social calamity warrants a different control and hence, the legislature comes up with special legislation with stringent provisions. The law having been enacted, there is a challenge to the constitutionality of the provisions. That is the subject matter of these appeals, for the judgments rendered by the High Courts of Orissa and Patna are under assail herein.” The need of the hour is to put this ratio and others as laid down by this Hon’ble Court vide the above mentioned judgment in to action in the case of corruptions and allegations of corruption in judiciary as well where the names of the judges are involved in corruption.
34.         Thus, being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of this Hon’ble Court dated 23.11.2015, the Petitioner has preferred the present Petition under Article 137 of the Constitution of India.
35.         The Petitioner is desirous of filing the present Petition on the following other -
G R O U N D S

Grounds in support of the reliefs sought for are fairly elaborated in the statement of facts above and hence are not repeated.  The Review Petitioner respectfully submits that paragraphs 2 to 13 hereinabove may be read and treated as the grounds in support of the instant Writ Petition. 

A.  The impugned judgment is erroneous on the face of it as  even the ordinary people with basic intelligence knows the difference between the opinion and information. The Impugned judgment has erroneously quoted the judgment of Shanti Bhushan and anr. Vs.Union of India and anr. (2009) 1 SCC 657, which had laid a totally different ratio, on some other grounds, which are not at all in question with the present issues. Further the disclosure of the commission of the cognizable offence is made trivial by the order of the Hon’ble High Court saying it is only an opinion, whereas the meaning of the terminology blog always shows that it includes the personal experience also, and the elementary fault by the  judges of Hon’ble High Court in not appreciating the said disclosure as his personal experience, thus making it a trivial issue, even though it is adversely affecting the reputation and dignity of judiciary as a whole and inter alia the National interest. The glaring dearth of the Hon’ble High Court is endorsed by this Hon’ble Court vide the order and judgment dated 23.11.2015, which is passed without hearing the petitioner, nor appreciating the grounds and issues, raised by him, not recording any of the contentions and arguments raised and without giving any reasoning to the issues and questions of law as raised by the petitioner, dismissed the SLP in limine. The matter involves the disclosure of corruption at the high offices, and the matter cannot be covered under the carpet, but the people of the Nation has the solemn right to know, what is happening with the national institutions.  The need for the investigation when the commission of a cognizable offence is disclosed is the very foundation of rule of law, upon which the Hon’ble High Court has erred and this Hon’ble Court by its silence has endorsed the same. Hence this petition for review of the given order and judgment dated 23.11.2015.
B.  Taking the order of the High Court of Delhi itself in -Court on its own motion Vs. Union of India through Ministry of Urban Development  and Ors.  in WP(C) 2345/2014 CM No. 5406/2015   the Hon’ble High Court took suo moto action upon the letter by the Judge of this Hon’ble Court, J.Kurian Joseph and acted upon the said letter, without treating the same as letter petition, and by engaging the amicus curie. The said precedent is failed to be followed in the matter of the instant case, even though the informant is the former judge of this Hon’ble Court. The only difference of the matter is that one is addressed to the High Court and the other is addressed to the world at large. But even in a case of children’s park and its toys, the Hon’ble High Court has taken suo moto action making it serious, and un pardonable, the same court at the same vain rejected the contention that the corruption at the high offices, and judiciary which is causing serious damage to the reputation of the Judiciary as a whole is not acted upon, which itself can cause the reputation and honour of this institution being seriously compromised, that too have been approved by this  Hon’ble Court silently, by the said non speaking order. The silence of this Hon’ble Court is hampering the reputation and prestige of this august institution and the majesty of this seat of justice.   This is approving the corruption and abetting the same in the judiciary, making the impugned judgment unconstitutional. The order passed by this Hon’ble Court in that vein is non est in the eyes of law. Hence the petitioner approaching this Hon’ble Court under the only remedy available through review, technically, even though factually this is original petition. The copy of the said judgment and order by Hon’le High Court of Delhi,  dated  16.04.2014 and followed up by orders dated 16.07.2014,13.08.2014,29.10.2014 in Court on its own motion Vs. Union of India through Ministry of Urban Development  and Ors.  in WP(C) 2345/2014 CM No. 5406/2015 is produced hereby and marked as Annexure-‘A’(Collectively).
C.  Even going by the precedent of the High Court of Delhi, in Court of its own Motion Vs. E.N. Communications Pvt.Ltd. and Ors. in Case CONT CAS.(CRL) 10/2014 the Hon’ble High Court had taken suo moto action against the publisher of the news, India Legal Magazine, based upon the publishing done in the magazine, which caused serious compromise to the reputation of the judiciary, even though the said article was exposing the nexus of the relatives of the sitting judge of the Hon’ble High Court. The extend of judicial action, which is against the principles of natural justice, which says, no man shall be a judge of his own cause, has proceeded in the same matter, where the allegations where against the illegal and unethical practices of the said judge and his close relatives, making him not a judge at all as the case involved his own interest. The second principle of natural justice namely, nemo debet bis vexari pro uno et eadem causa or nemo iudex in sua causa or nemo debet esse judex in propria causa – no one can be judge in his own cause –  is violated by the said Judge, making the said judgment and order, again non est in the eyes of law.   Still the cognizance of the news article published was taken suo moto by the same judge against whom the allegations are made. The intentions of the actions in the given case and the instant petition are the same by the Hon’ble High Court, to suppress the truth, hide the corrupt, and promote the corruption, ignoring and threatening the whistle blowers. This Hon’ble Court by the order dated 23.11.2015 approved and made it a law of the land under Article 141 of the Constitution to suppress the truth and promote the corruption in judiciary, and thus compromising upon the reputation and dignity of this sacrosanct institution.   
D.  The words of Jesus Christ “Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye”  is as applicable to even the judges of the Highest  Court of the land as well, in the present context. The petitioner relays on the judgment of this Hon’ble Court dated 10.12.2015 on the Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and Ors. in which it is quoted as “Corruption, a 'noun' when assumes all the characteristics of a Verb', becomes self-infective and also develops resistance to antibiotics. In such a situation the disguised protagonist never puts a Hamletian question-"to be or not to be"-but marches ahead with perverted proclivity-sans concern, sans care for collective interest, and irrefragably without conscience. In a way, corruption becomes a national economic terror. This social calamity warrants a different control and hence, the legislature comes up with special legislation with stringent provisions. The law having been enacted, there is a challenge to the constitutionality of the provisions. That is the subject matter of these appeals, for the judgments rendered by the High Courts of Orissa and Patna are under assail herein.” The need of the hour is to put this ratio and others as laid down by this Hon’ble Court vide the above mentioned judgment in to action in the case of corruptions and allegations of corruption in judiciary as well where the names of the judges are involved in corruption.  As the judgment and order Decided On: 10.12.2015 in the case of Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal and Ors. Vs.  State of Bihar and Ors.  in Civil Appeal Nos. 6448-6452, 6460 of 2011, Criminal Appeal Nos. 360-378, 385-386, 387, 388, 379-384, 389, 390, 1371, 1372 of 2012, Criminal Appeal No. 1678 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4558/2012), Criminal Appeal No. 1679 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3084/2013) and Criminal Appeal No. 1680 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3085/2013), which is subsequent to the impugned order dated 23.11.2015, of this Hon’ble Court, the said ratio laid down in the said judgment is liable to be applied to the instant case as well. This stands as one of the grounds for the review of the instant order dated 23.11.2015.    

E.   The judgement in which  review has been sought by means of the present review petition has been delivered by a bench that also included Hon'ble Mr. Justice H. L. Dattu (now retired, herein, Dattu, J.).     It is most respectfully submitted that the blog that led to the writ petition has been penned by Justice Markandey Katju (retired Supreme Court Judge). In the same blog, he has also laid bare extensive allegations of corruption against Dattu, J. An extract of the blog to that effect is appended hereto, and is marked as Annexure 2.        This being so, Dattu, J. was disqualified from hearing the SLP, as he undoubtedly had a natural bias against setting aside the impugned judgement of the honourable High Court, because if he were to do so, it could also open the floodgates for investigation also against his own self, given that his name also has been figuring prominently in the same blog for reasons of not mere corruption, but for "massive corruption".        On this ground alone, the order of this honourable Court which is sought to be reviewed and recalled is, in legal fact, a "nullity" in law, and void ab initio as if non-est, as it suffers from the affliction of a violation of one of the most cardinal principles of natural Justice i.e. namely, nemo debet bis vexari pro uno et eadem causa or nemo iudex in sua causa or nemo debet esse judex in propria causa – no one can be judge in his own cause.
F.   That yet another round for review and recall of the order passed by this honourable Court is that this court has not appreciated that the order of the High Court impugned before this honourable Court reflected a patent lack of application of judicial mind.    This conclusion follows because the High Court did not come to the conclusion that the blog attributed to Justice Katju was a hoax, and in fact, was penned by someone else.       This being so, and for its reasoning and rationale to be consistent de hors the stature of the allegedly-offending citizen before it, if the High Court was of the view that the contents of the blog were only an "opinion", meaning, a "murmuring" not worthy of judicial recognition to trigger an investigation, at the same time, it chose not to initiate any action against Justice Katju.       In other words, this honourable Court, while refusing to interfere in the impugned judgement of the High Court, has granted "Open General Licence" to any and every person to call judges of India corrupt, so long as he does it in the form of a blog. As this proposition is causing serious denture to the reputation and image of the judiciary of the nation the said judgment and ratio cannot be allowed to sustain and hence this review petition, to declare the said order non est in the eyes of law.  
G.  Furthermore, by not taking action against the petitioner for having got activated into the filing of a writ petition based on the contents of the blog (meaning, "echoing" the contents of the blog, and/or "disseminating" for wide public consumption the contents of the same blog), this court has granted, similarly, "Open General Licence" to any and every person to make allegations even inside the court, so long as he is "quoting" the contents of a blog.    Whereas, in a recent case involving a lady advocate (one Seema Sapra) who called a sitting judge of the Delhi High Court (Vibhu Bakhru, J.) "corrupt", a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court has deemed it fit to sentence her to 1 months imprisonment, and also, banned her from exercising her statutory - even fundamental - right to practice the profession of her choice (as an advocate) for two years.     In other words, in the case of the petitioner's writ petition, no action was taken by the Delhi High Court against an exalted dignitary such as Justice Markandey Katju (but nor against the "ordinary" petitioner, either) for stating  - or (in the petitioner's case) "echoing" / "disseminating" - that a certain named judge is corrupt, whereas, in the case of another advocate, merely for saying that a particular judge is corrupt, she has been sentenced to prison.       Perhaps the mistake that lady advocate made was that she foolishly attributed the word "corrupt" to herself, when what she ought to have done is to have caused the creation of a blog and put the same allegation on the blog, and then stated in open court that she is referring to Vibhu Bakhru (J.) as corrupt only because so-and-so blog says so.       Such an approach on the part of the Delhi High Court is either arbitrary, or is discriminatory, or both.      In fact, it is worse, as it is  a consciously-exercised "capricious" use of discretion in order to save, inter alia, a named offender from the punishment lawfully due to him merely because he holds a similar Constitutional post as the Judges who passed the impugned order, which itself is an offence under sections 217-218 of the Indian Penal Code on the part of the two High Court Judges that passed the order impugned before this honourable Court.            Adoption of double standards is not expected out of the sacrosanct institution which is the temple of justice. Independence of judiciary and supremacy does not mean, there can a slaughter house be opened.  The double standards exposed by this order and the silence of this Hon’ble Court is slaughtering of the Rule of law and constitutional mechanism.  But this honourable Court cannot have it both ways i.e. that it will neither interfere in the judgement of the Delhi High Court impugned by the petitioner before this honourable Court, and will also remain a mute spectator in the case of advocate Seema Sapra. 
H.  The intention of the petitioner is to cause cleaning up of the judicial system by the judicial order passed by this Hon’ble Court, before the virus of the corruption grows into cancer demanding amputation and resultant death. If the judiciary continues to fail to act in accordance with law, it can lead to jungle raj and destruction of nation. The democratic organs and system will be under serious threat. Hence the instant review petition.


PRAYER
It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to take recourse to the procedure of review and:

a)          declare that the judgment and order dated 23.11.2015 passed by this Hon’ble Court in S.L.P. No.8687/2015, unconstitutional and void;
b)          declare that the instant Review Petition, which though filed as a petition for review, is indeed, an original proceeding as the petitioner has not been heard and no reasoning given for the dismissal of the same in the light of the declarations sought for as above in the open Court;    
d)     pass any such other order or orders/directions as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice.

    
   DRAWN                                                  FILED BY



 (A.C.Philip)                                             (R.P.Luthra)

MOP for appointment of Judges Petition by Adv.Mathews J.Nedumpara, demanding open selection

The Petitioner is a citizen of India.  He was enrolled as an Advocate in the year 1984 with the Bar Council of Kerala and has been in active practice since then.  The Petitioner begs to state, even at the risk of being misunderstood to be praising himself, that during his practice as a lawyer over three decades, he has had occasion to deal with almost all branches of law in the different Courts in the country.  Currently he appears in the High Courts of Bombay and Chandigarh and, of late, in the Supreme Court of India, as well.  The Petitioner, therefore, considers himself to be eligible to apply for the august office of the Judge of a High Court of the country or of the Supreme Court, while in all humility concedes at the same breath with least hesitation that the authorities invested with the power of selection and appointment of Judges under the Constitution of India may find him ineligible for the post, which fact or finding he is too willing to accept with great grace.

2.     The Petitioner, who is leading a campaign titled National Lawyers’ Campaign for Judicial Transparency and Reforms, has observed since the judgments of the Supreme Court in Judges-2 and Judges-3 cases that selection and appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court and High Courts have largely been of the elite class of lawyers, namely, the kith and kin of sitting and former Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, celebrated lawyers, Chief Ministers, Governors et al and a few first generation lawyers who are all politically connected or are close to big industrial houses.  The Petitioner, with great amount of pain, begs to further submit that Judges so appointed, who constitute to be the super elite class among lawyers, in turn appointed their kith and kin, relatives and friends as Senior Advocates.  The fallout thereof is disquieting.  The sons and daughters of common men, taxi drivers, teachers, farmers, small traders and venders those in the private and public sector in the lower rungs, who constitute to be 98% of the legal fraternity, have no place anywhere near the higher echelons of judicial office.  However, there a few exceptions and the world know the reasons, the Godfathers and the connections they had.  With the Bench and the Bar, the latter for all practical purposes means the elite class of lawyers mentioned above, literally being under the monopoly of the elite upper class meant another class, a miscellaneous or lower caste, of lawyers who are literal untouchables in the sanctum sanctorum of the Temples of Justice.  Casteism in the legal profession, though not on the lines advocated by Manu, is a reality.  The Petitioner believes that he has no reason to hesitate to admit that he belongs to the untouchable class of lawyers who have no Godfathers.

3.     The Petitioner is no great admirer of the system which was in prevalence prior to 1993 when the executive appointed Judges of the higher judiciary in consultation with the Chief Justice of India (CJI) in the case of the Supreme Court and the Chief Justices of the High Courts in the case of High Courts.  But the collegium system, an offspring of the judgments in Judges-2 and Judges-3 cases, a mechanism to insulate judicial appointments uninfluenced by extraneous considerations and to secure appointment of the most deserving, has, far from achieving the said goal, led to oligarchy, to borrow an expression of legendary Justice Krishna Iyer, who was the greatest critic of the collegium system.  The painstaking study undertaken by the Petitioner of the judgments in Judges-1, Judges-2 and Judges-3 cases, so too the judgment of the Full Bench of the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati v. the State of Kerala (1973) Supp. SCR 1, made him realize that the judgments in Judges-2 and Judges-3 cases are rendered per incuriam and the judgment in Kesavananda Bharati, though one elevated to the status of Bible and Bhagwat Geeta and therefore of which no criticism could be made, is a judgment against the basic tenets of jurisprudence, and the judgments in Judges-2 and Judges-3 cases, to a large extent, are the products of the mischief of the purported ratio of Kesavananda Bharati.  The Petitioner also realized that the sole reason for the national calamity, which the judgments in Judges-2 and Judges-3 cases are, is the admission of locus standi as to the maintainability of Judges-1 case and the concession made by the then Attorney General in Judges-3 case that the Government of India is not seeking a review of the judgment in Judges-2 case as “the law of the land”.  The Petitioner accordingly instituted a Writ Petition, namely, Writ Petition No.214, in the Supreme Court in the month of April, 2014 seeking a declaration that the judgments in Judges-2 and Judges-3 cases are void; that the appointment of Judges has to be made in terms of the very text of the Constitution; and that even if the judgments in Judges-2 and Judges-3 cases are to be held as good law, then also within the ambit of the said judgments an open and transparent selection and appointment of Judges by advertising the vacancies, inviting applications from public at large is possible.  The reliefs sought for in the said Writ Petition are as infra:-
a)             issue notice to the public at large in terms of   Order I Rule 8(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; as also to the Hon'ble Chief Justices of the 29 High Courts in India through the Registrar General or such other officer empowered to receive process on behalf of the Hon'ble Chief Justices in terms of the Rule or practice in vogue;
b)             declare that Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution, in spite of the judgments of the Supreme Court in Judges-2 and Judgers-3 cases, remain in the statute book and that the said judgments, in so far as they have meant tearing  off of the Constitution in the name of interpretation/construction of the said provisions, travel far beyond it and are void and the constitutional provisions as framed by the Founding Fathers and enacted into law continue to be in force and that it is absolutely possible to make an open and transparent selection and appointment of Judges by notification of the vacancies by advertisement and open selection pending completion of the legislative process of amendment of the Constitution by virtue of Constitution (121st Amendment) Bill, 2014 and enactment of the National Judicial Appointment Commission Bill, 2014 into a law;
c)              issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the Respondents, particularly the Union of India,  the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India and the Hon'ble Justices constituting the members of the collegium in the Supreme Court, the Hon'ble Chief Justices of the High Courts and the Hon'ble Justices constituting the members of the collegium in the High Courts to advertise the vacancies of the posts of Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, invite applications from all eligible candidates as also recommendations and references from all stakeholders, including the members of the Bar, Bar Associations, sitting and retired Judges, leaders of political parties and NGOs, which will ensure a large pool from which selection of Judges could be made, diametrically opposite to the small pool of kith and kin of Judges and those mostly connected with the Judges who constitute the collegium, as is the present practice, notify the names and particulars of the candidates who are found eligible and selected, invite objections, if any, from public at large so that appointment s in terms of Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution of India are made possible, even while retaining the mechanism of collegium, though the Petitioner in no way endorses it, till the Constitution (121st  Amendment) Bill, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointment Commission Bill, 2014 become laws, the former having received the assent of majority of the States;
d)             issue a writ in the nature of prohibition or any other appropriate writ, order or direction restraining and prohibiting the collegium of the Supreme Court of India headed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India; so too the collegiums of the High Courts headed by their respective Chief Justices from making recommendation for appointment to the august office of the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts in the cabal manner, as is the present case, without notification of the vacancies by advertisement and inviting applications from all eligible candidates, references and recommendations from the Members of the Bar, Bar Associations, sitting and retired Judges and the public at large and without making public the names of the candidates who are selected and further to restrict and prohibit the Union of India from proceeding upon the recommendations, if any, under process, one rendered in a cabal manner, till the Constitution (121st  Amendment) Bill, 2014 is ratified by majority of the States and becomes a law; so too the National Judicial Appointment Commission Bill, 2014;
e)               pass any such other order or orders/directions as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice.

4.     While the said Writ Petition was pending, the Government of India, in terms of the promise made by it in its election manifesto of an open and transparent selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, brought in the Constitution (121st  Amendment) Bill, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointment Commission Bill, 2014.  The said Bills were passed by both the Houses of the Parliament, received the assent of the President of India on 31st Dec.2014 and became the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointment Commission Act, 2014 (the Acts, for short).  However, they were not notified.  The Petitioner accordingly instituted Writ Petition No.________ in the Supreme Court seeking a mandamus to the Union of India to notify the said Acts, frame rules and thereby make open and transparent selection and appointment of Judges, allowing the long cherished dream of the people a reality.

5.     In the meanwhile, certain elite class of lawyers, the so-called legal luminaries, mesmerized the people of this country and ordinary lawyers to believe that a judgment of the Supreme Court in a case between A and B is not merely a precedent when a case between C and D involving the same issues, but is the “law of the land”; that it is not the Parliament which declares the law of the land, but the Supreme Court, and filed petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution titling them as PILs, which later came to be known as the NJAC case.  PIL as envisaged by the legendary Judges like P.N. Bhagwati, Y.V. Chandrachud, V.R. Krishna Iyer et al, only meant that where a person whose constitutional and legal rights are infringed and who out of his poverty, ignorance, illiteracy and other disadvantages is unable to approach a constitutional Court, any person acting pro bono publico can, without any express authority from the person aggrieved, act on his behalf.  PIL only meant relaxation of the concept of locus standi to make justice delivery system accessible to the poor, illiterate and such others.  However, PIL, today, which one of the greatest propounders of the said benevolent jurisprudence as it was originally understood, had been castigated to be reduced to a “ravenous wolf in sheep's clothing”.  Thus, though PIL was not meant to be a device to substitute the executive and legislature by Courts and the Courts to act as if it is the executive, legislature and judiciary, all at once, the legal luminaries and some among them, who are accused of running a Rs.500 crore PIL industry, mesmerized the people of this country and ordinary lawyers and made them to think otherwise.



6.     To invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, there must be a “person aggrieved”.  One could be said to be a person aggrieved where his fundamental rights are infringed.  The Acts in question, the Petitioner begs to submit, cannot be said to infringe the fundamental rights of anyone, for, the said enactments are enactments in the realm of executive and legislative policy, which are wholly non-justiciable.  Yet, the Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association (SCAORA) instituted a Writ Petition under Article 32 seeking a declaration that the said Acts are unconstitutional without a plea that their or their members’ fundamental rights are violated.  The learned Advocate General was duty bound to raise the plea of non-maintainability of the said Writ Petition, for, to repeat, for maintenance of a PIL there must be a person aggrieved and SCAORA and the Bar Council of India, the Petitioners in the Writ Petitions, have not stated who is the person aggrieved;  that the only persons who can be said to be aggrieved are the Judges of the High Courts and the Supreme Court who could be said to be invested with a legitimate expectation, an equitable right, for elevation as a Judge of the Supreme Court or as the Chief Justice of a High Court, but they were not Petitioners in the Supreme Court; that SCAORA and the Bar Council of India have not made any assertion that the said Writ Petitions were instituted on behalf of such Judges who could not have, on their own, instituted them for enforcement of their fundamental rights; and that the controversy raised in the said Writ Petitions were in the realm of executive and legislative policy and therefore not justiciable.  The learned Attorney General, like his predecessors in 1981, 1993 and 1998, by failing to raise the fundamental plea that the challenge to the said Acts is not maintainable, invited the judgment dated 16th October, 2015 at the hands of the Five-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court holding that the said Acts are unconstitutional.

7.     “Brevity is the soul of wit”, said Shakespeare.  The Petitioner begs to submit that the Five-Judge Constitution Bench in NJAC case took notice of the fact that the collegium system has failed; that it is imperative to improve it and exhorted that it is time for “glasnost” (openness) and “perestroika” (restructuring), and accordingly it invited suggestions from Bar Associations, legal luminaries and the ultimate stakeholders, the public at large.  The public at large responded to the call of the Supreme Court in an overwhelming measure, though they were given a few days and that too in the midst of the 2015 Diwali Holidays to submit their opinions and suggestions in the realm of (i) Transparency, (ii) Collegium Secretariat   (iii) Eligibility Criteria and (iv) Complaints. With utmost respect the Petitioner begs to submit that the supreme Court realized that inviting suggestions from the public is in the realm of legislation, though it did not expressly say so, and when opinions and suggestions running into 15,000 pages from thousands of people are received it is impossible to decide which opinion should be accepted or rejected.  A copy of the main judgment is not produced and the Petitioner begs to refer to it since it has been reported in ________________.  A copy of the order dated 05.11.2015 by which suggestions from the public was sought is produced as Annexure P-1.

8.     As to be reminded of the words of Horace, parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus, the Supreme Court, the Petitioner salutes its sagacity and wisdom in realizing that the task of inviting opinions and suggestions from the public at large as to the ways and means by which the collegium system could be improved and acting upon those suggestions is too cumbersome/onerous, by order dated 16.12.2015 directed the Government of India to prepare a Memorandum of Procedure for appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary in consultation with the CJI.  A copy of the order dated 16.12.2015 is produced as Annexure P-2.

9.     The aforesaid Acts, by which a mechanism for appointment of Judges of the higher judiciary by NJAC in substitution of the collegium system, which has failed entirely and has resulted in oligarchy, corruption and nepotism, were held to be unconstitutional by the judgment dated 16th October, 2015.  The NJAC was aborted and the collegium system is restored.  The Government has not filed any petition seeking review of the said judgment.  The only review petition is the one which has been filed by the Petitioner.  The Petitioner in all humility concedes that he is so inconsequential that his efforts to secure a review of the judgment dated 16th October, 2015 and restore the NJAC is a near impossibility.  The Petitioner, therefore, considers that it is only prudent on his part to accept the burial of the NJAC as a fait accompli and to pursue some other feasible means to secure the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution a reality.

10.   The august offices of the Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts are public offices of great esteem and sanctity.  Every lawyer, nay, every citizen of this country, who satisfies the qualifications and criteria prescribed under Articles 124(3) & 217(2) of the Constitution, is entitled to aspire for selection and appointment to the said posts, and to be selected and appointed if the authorities invested with such function find him eligible and suitable.  The Petitioner begs to submit that he commits no crime in harbouring a thought that there should exist a system where he could also apply for and be selected and appointed as a Judge, if eligible, and whether he is eligible or suitable ought to be determined by certain eligibility criteria or standard prescribed.  It is the duty of the authority invested with the power to make selection and appointment that it makes such appointment in an open, transparent, non-arbitrary, just and fair manner so that not merely the Petitioner but hundreds and thousands of lawyers across the breadth and width of the country, who consider themselves to be eligible for the post, are not denied their fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

11.   The judgment dated 16th October, 2015 recognizes and holds that certain rules or regulations ought to be made in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges of the higher judiciary and accordingly invited suggestions and opinions from the public at large identifying or confining to four core areas, namely, (i) Transparency, (ii) Collegium Secretariat, (iii) Eligibility Criteria and   (iv) Complaints.  If rules and regulations or Memorandum of Procedure, no matter by what name it is known, no matter whether it is statutory or non-statutory or merely executive, it is absolutely necessary that its draft so made is made known to the public at large.  The Petitioner is aged 57 years.  Assuming that the age limit is fixed at 55 years, he may have a grievance.  Assuming that the age limit is kept at 60 years, he may not have any grievance.  But the Memorandum of Procedure unfailingly ought to prescribe the eligibility criteria, including the upper and lower age limit, the income limit, though the Petitioner is against the same, etc.  The most pointed accusation against the collegium system of appointment is that it is absolutely cabal, which meant the exalted office of the Judges of the higher judiciary being literally monopolized by the kith and kin of Judges, and the vast majority of lawyers who have no connections with the members of the collegium are left out; they do not even come to know that vacancies of Judges are being filled up. The word “invitation” is the most scandalous one, for, it has meant only the kith and kin of sitting and former Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, celebrated lawyers, et al being invited to occupy the august office.  In other words, the greatest demand of the legal fraternity, the civil society, the public at large, is that vacancies in the office of the Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts be notified, invitations and references from all eligible be called for, the selection procedure should be made wholly transparent, minutes of the proceedings of the collegium be open to the public and in particular through the Right to Information Act.  The order dated 16.12.2015 by which the Constitution Bench directed the Government of India to frame a Memorandum of Procedure in consultation with the CJI has not given any directions even in the realm of notifying the vacancies and inviting applications/references from eligible candidates.  The Petitioner is an ordinary Advocate; he has no connections with the higher ups; he knows nothing about what happens in the higher echelons of power.  But he is made to understand that the Ministry of Justice, which has formulated or is formulating the Memorandum of Procedure, has not included in it notification of the vacancies to the legal fraternity, nay, the public at large, and invitation of applications/ references from members of Bar Associations and general public, though at the hearing of the NJAC case the learned Attorney General, time and again, reiterated that the Government is in favour of advertisement of vacancies and open selection so too total openness of the method of selection and appointment, and make the Right to Information Act applicable to it.  The legal fraternity, nay, the public at large, is kept in total darkness as to the ways and means by which the collegium system could be improved, which should reflect in the Memorandum of Procedure which is said to be under discussion with the CJI.  The Petitioner is made to understand that the Memorandum of Procedure has failed to translate the need of the hour, namely, “glasnost” and  “perestroika”, which will be achieved only if the following are incorporated in the Memorandum of Procedure in unmistakable terms:-
(i)     Notification of vacancies;
(ii)    Invitation of applications from lawyers who are considered to be eligible; so also references from Bar Associations, lawyers and even public at large as to whom they consider to be eligible and deserving;
(iii)   Short-listing of applications/references so received;
(iv)   Notify to the legal fraternity and the public at large the names which are short-listed;
(v)    Provide for a mechanism for dealing with complaints against the names short-listed;
(vi)   Provide for the composition of the Collegium Secretariat;
(vii)  Give access to documents/minutes of the collegium, including application of Right to Information Act, as well.

12.   It is possible that the apprehensions expressed by the Petitioner above that the Government is not considering inclusion of the above points in the Memorandum of Procedure, that the Memorandum of Procedure under preparation or which has already been prepared means no tangible improvement of the collegium system, which was condemned by all, may not be true, for, for the Petitioner cannot claim any sanctity to his source of information, in which case this Writ Petition may become infructuous and the Petitioner will have to seek leave of this Hon'ble Court to withdraw the same.  If, on the contrary, what the Petitioner has heard from informal, not so reliable sources, is true and the collegium system is restored without any improvement with no amount of “glasnost” and  “perestroika” and the same continues to be the cabal system as before, then the Petitioner is entitled to seek a mandamus at the hands of this Hon'ble Court directing the Government of India to incorporate in the Memorandum of Procedure the requirements enumerated above, which will make the collegium system transparent and will afford an opportunity to all those who are eligible and deserving to apply for the post of Judges of the higher judiciary.  Hence, the instant Writ Petition.

GROUNDS
                Grounds in support of the reliefs sought for are fairly elaborated in the statement of facts above and hence are not repeated.  The Petitioner respectfully submits that paragraphs 1 to 12 hereinabove may be read and treated as the grounds in support of the instant Writ Petition.

13.   Petitioner craves leave of this Hon’ble Court to add to, alter, amend and/or modify any of the aforesaid grounds as and when required.

14.   The Petitioner states that he has no other efficacious alternative remedy than to prefer the instant Writ Petition.

15.   The Petitioner has not filed any other Petition before this Hon’ble Court seeking such similar relief as being sought in this Petition.

P R A Y E R

        It is, therefore, this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to:

a)          issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing Respondent No.10, Union of India to incorporate in the Memorandum of Procedure, under preparation or already prepared, for appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary the following requirements, namely:
       
(i)     Notification of vacancies;
(ii)    Invitation of applications from lawyers who are considered to be eligible; so also references from Bar Associations, lawyers and even public at large as to whom they consider to be eligible and deserving;
(iii)   Short-listing of applications/references so received;
(iv)   Notify to the legal fraternity and the public at large the names which are short-listed;
(v)    Provide for a mechanism for dealing with complaints against the names short-listed;
(vi)   Provide for the composition of the Collegium Secretariat;
(vii)  Give access to documents/minutes of the collegium, including application of Right to Information Act, as well.

b)     ---------------------

c)     pass such other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case.
                                                        DRAWN & FILED BY