Sunday, 27 March 2016

FRESH PETITION IN SUPREME COURT AGAINST THE JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.              OF 2016
(D)No.7993/2016

IN THE MATTER OF

Mathews J. Nedumpara                                        …PETITIONER
Versus
The Union of India & Ors.                               …RESPONDENTS

SYNOPSIS AND LIST OF DATES

                        The Petitioner is a citizen of India and is a lawyer by profession, enrolled with the Bar Council of Kerala in 1984, and in active practice since then.  The instant Writ Petition is filed for the enforcement of his fundamental rights as enshrined in Articles 14, 19 and even 21 of the Constitution, which the Petitioner asserts to be violated by the judgments of this Hon'ble Court in Judges-2, Judges-3 and Judges-5, namely, the majority judgment dated 16th October, 2015 in the NJAC           case (Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India and others), the orders dated 05.11.2015 & 19.11.2015 and the further orders dated 16.12.2015 passed by this Hon'ble Court by which it brought back the collegium system in full swing even while in its judgment dated 16th October, 2015 it was pleased to hold that the collegium system has failed; that it has given room for many a genuine grievances; that it required improvement and that the solution therefore is “glasnost” and  “perestroika”.  Aggrieved by the judgment dated 16th October, 2015, which meant this Hon'ble Court having entertained a challenge on the Constitution (Ninety Ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointment Commission Act, 2014, legislations in the realm of executive and legislative policy, bringing in thereby the NJAC, a remedy which the Parliament, which is the voice of the people, in its wisdom felt to be the appropriate remedy to undo the mischief which the collegium system constitutes to be, the Petitioner instituted a Writ Petition seeking a declaration that the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court are void by recourse to the procedure called review. 
                        Since review petitions are decided by circulation and are not listed for hearing in the open Court, which for all practical purposes means the procedure of review redundant, the Petitioner filed an application seeking the hearing of the review petition in the open Court.  To secure such a hearing in the open Court, the Petitioner sought constitution of a Bench by mentioning at 10.30 a.m. on 11 Jan 2016 before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India (CJI).  Upon His Lordship being pleased to direct the Petitioner to mention before Hon'ble Shri Justice J.S. Khehar, who headed the Constitution Bench in the NJAC case, a request was made to that effect before His Lordship in the open Court, but the said request was declined.  Thereupon the Petitioner mentioned once again before the Hon'ble CJI, though in vain.  Thereafter the Petitioner, placing faith in the dictum nihil desperandum – never despair – of Marcus Tullius Cicero, the greatest lawyer ever lived on the planet, mentioned the matter before Hon'ble S/Shri Justices Jasti Chelameswar and Kurian Joseph, but, the Petitioner is afraid to say, in vain.  Thereafter the Petitioner mentioned once again before Hon'ble Shri Justice Khehar on 08/02/2016 while His Lordship was presiding over a Five-Judge Constitution Bench constituted to hear an issue altogether different since the Petitioner’s review petition was, as per the Cause List, listed at 1.30 p.m. on that day.  The said review petition was dismissed.
                        While the Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association instituted the PIL seeking to quash the Constitution (Ninety Ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointment Commission Act, 2014, the instant Petitioner in Writ Petition No.124 of 2015 sought a declaration that the judgments in Judges-2 and Judges-3 cases are void; that the supreme Court is invested with no power to declare what the law of the land is; that the power to declare what the law of the land is in the exclusive domain of the legislature; that the concept that a judgment of the Supreme Court constitutes to be the law of the land and that is what is provided in Article 141 of the Constitution is a misconception; that Article 141 only provides that a judgment of the Supreme Court in a case between A and B, if it contains a ratio, is binding when similar dispute or controversy arises between C and D as a precedent of great authoritativeness  and nothing more; and that the judgments in Judges-2 and Judges-3 cases are wholly erroneous and void, for, they are founded on the premise that Articles 141 invests in the Supreme Court the power to declare what the law of the land is.  However, in the judgment dated 16th October, 2015, running into more than a thousand pages, there is not even a whisper on merits about Writ Petition No.124 of 2015 wherein the Petitioner had sought declarations as aforesaid; so too to the plea of the Petitioner that the challenge of the Constitution (Ninety Ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointment Commission Act, 2014 is wholly not maintainable, the said Acts being legislations in the realm of executive and legislative policy and hence non-justiciable.  Hence the instant Writ Petition (Civil).

The List of  Dates

31.12.2014                  Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointment Commission Act, 2014 are passed by the Parliament of India.
15.04.2015                  Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointment Commission Act, 2014 are notified by the government of India as operational.
16.10.2015                  The Constitution Bench of this Hon’ble Court declared the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointment Commission Act, 2014 as void and unconstitutional.
03.11.2015                  Further sitting of the Constitutional Bench, after passing the final order and judgment, for the improvement of the collegium system.
05.11.2015                  The Constitutional Bench of this Hon’ble Court, invite the public opinion on the issue of improving the collegium system. After quashing the said Acts has, by order dated 5th November, 2015, invited suggestions from the public at large to improve the collegium system.  In doing so, the Supreme Court, it must be stated with utmost respect, failed to take note of the following aspects:-
That the public at large could not be asked to give their opinions and suggestions in a short span of 8 days and that too in the midst of Diwali Holidays;
If the opinion of the public at large is to be sought, then they should be free to make their opinion without putting any restrictions, for, in the order dated 5th November, 2015 the Supreme Court has said that the suggestions shall be confined to four aspects, namely:
·   Transparency
·   Collegium Secretariat
·   Eligibility Criteria
·   Complaints
That the requirement to hear the public at large under Order-I, Rule 8(2) of the code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 was before the case was heard and decided and not subsequent thereto; and while it was entirely legitimate to hear the public at large before the case was decided, to hear them after the decision of the case amounts to legislation in substitution of the Parliament, nay, even its constituent power.
18 & 19.11.2015        Further sitting of the Constitutional Bench, hearing the public opinion.
19.11.2015                 Further orders of this Hon’ble Court by its Constitutional Bench for the revival of the collegium, without causing any improvement, as  sought by the constitution Bench of this Hon’ble Court or suggested by the public at large, reserving the order and concluding the hearing.
16.12.2015                  Final order of the Constitutional Bench of this Hon’ble Court, disposing of the petitions, keeping the improvement of the collegium unfinished, and leaving to the Union Government for the issue of Memorandum of Procedure for the appointments Judges, and the expected and most promising ‘Perestroika’ and ‘Glasnost’ being dumped to the drains, and further allowing the imperfect system of collegium to function, causing serious damage and prejudice to the interest of the Nation as well as the independence and reputation of judiciary.
29.02.2016                 The instant Writ Petition (Civil) Filed.

PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA SEEKING DECLARATION AND OTHER RELIEFS.

TO
THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND
HIS COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE
HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

THE HUMBLE PETITION OF THE PETITIONER ABOVE NAMED

MOST RESPECTFULLY SHEWETH
1.      The Petitioner is a citizen of India.  He was enrolled as an Advocate in the year 1984 with the Bar Council of Kerala and has been in active practice since then.  The Petitioner begs to state, even at the risk of being misunderstood to be praising himself, that during his practice as a lawyer over three decades, he has had occasion to deal with almost all branches of law in the different Courts in the country.  Currently he appears in the High Courts of Bombay, Delhi, Kerala and Punjab and Haryana and, of late, in the Supreme Court of India, as well.  The Petitioner, therefore, considers himself to be eligible to apply for the august office of the Judge of a High Court of the country or of the Supreme Court, while in all humility concedes at the same breath with least hesitation that the authorities invested with the power of selection and appointment of Judges under the Constitution of India may find him ineligible for the post, which fact or finding he is too willing to accept with all humility and grace.

2.      The Petitioner, who is leading a campaign titled ‘National Lawyers’ Campaign for Judicial Transparency and Reforms’, has observed since the judgments of the Supreme Court in Judges-2 and Judges-3 cases that selection and appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court and High Courts have largely been of the elite class of lawyers, namely, the kith and kin of sitting and former Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, celebrated lawyers, Chief Ministers, Governors et al and a few first generation lawyers who are all politically connected or are close to big industrial houses.  The Petitioner, with great amount of pain, begs to further submit that Judges so appointed, who constitute to be the super elite class among lawyers, in turn appointed their kith and kin, relatives and friends as Senior Advocates.  The fallout thereof is disquieting.  The sons and daughters of common men, taxi drivers, teachers, farmers, small traders and vendors those in the private and public sector in the lower rungs, who constitute to be 98% of the legal fraternity, have no place anywhere near the higher echelons of judicial office.  However, there are some exceptions and the world knows the reasons, the Godfathers and the connections they had.  With the Bench and the Bar, the latter for all practical purposes means the elite class of lawyers mentioned above, literally being under the monopoly of the elite upper class meant another class, a miscellaneous or lower caste, of lawyers who are literal untouchables in the sanctum sanctorum of the Temples of Justice.  The casteism in the legal profession, though not on the lines advocated by Manu, is a reality.  The Petitioner believes that he has no reason to hesitate to admit that he belongs to the untouchable class of lawyers who have no Godfathers.

3.      The Petitioner is no great admirer of the system which was in prevalence prior to 1993 when the executive appointed Judges of the higher judiciary in consultation with the Chief Justice of India (CJI) in the case of the Supreme Court and the Chief Justices of the High Courts as well, in the case of High Courts.  But the collegium system, an offspring of the judgments in Judges-2 and Judges-3 cases, a mechanism to insulate judicial appointments uninfluenced by extraneous considerations and to secure appointment of the most deserving, has, far from achieving the said goal, led to oligarchy, to borrow an expression of the legendary Justice Krishna Iyer, who was the greatest critic of the collegium system.  The painstaking study undertaken by the Petitioner of the judgments in Judges-1, Judges-2 and Judges-3 cases, so too the judgment of the Full Bench of the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati v. the State of Kerala (1973) Supp. SCR 1, made him realize that the judgments in Judges-2 and Judges-3 cases are rendered per incuriam and the judgment in Kesavananda Bharati, though one elevated to the status of Bible and Bhagwat Geeta and therefore of which no criticism could be made, is a judgment against the basic tenets of jurisprudence, and the judgments in Judges- 1,2 and 3 cases, to a large extent, are the products of the mischief of the purported ratio of Kesavananda Bharati.  The Petitioner also realized that the sole reason for the national calamity, which the judgments in Judges-2 and Judges-3 cases are, is the admission of ‘locus standi’ as to the maintainability of Judges-1&2 cases and the concession made by the then Attorney General in Judges-3 case that the Government of India is not seeking a review of the judgment in Judges-2 case as “the law of the land”.  The Petitioner, accordingly, instituted a Writ Petition, namely, Writ Petition No.214, in the Supreme Court in the month of April, 2014 seeking a declaration that the judgments in Judges-1,2 and Judges-3 cases are void; that the appointment of Judges has to be made in terms of the very text of the Constitution; and that even if the judgments in Judges-2 and Judges-3 cases are to be held as good law, then also within the ambit of the said judgments an open and transparent selection and appointment of Judges by advertising the vacancies, inviting applications from public at large is possible.  The reliefs sought for in the said Writ Petition were as infra:-
i.            the said judgments, in so far as they have meant tearing  off of the Constitution in the name of interpretation/construction of the said provisions, travel far beyond it and are void and the constitutional provisions as framed by the Founding Fathers and enacted into law continue to be in force and that it is absolutely possible to make an open and transparent selection and appointment of Judges by notification of the vacancies by advertisement and open selection pending completion of the legislative process of amendment of the Constitution by virtue of Constitution (121st Amendment) Bill, 2014 and enactment of the National Judicial Appointment Commission Bill, 2014 into a law;
ii.            issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the Respondents, particularly the Union of India,  the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India and the Hon'ble Justices constituting the members of the collegium in the Supreme Court, the Hon'ble Chief Justices of the High Courts and the Hon'ble Justices constituting the members of the collegium in the High Courts to advertise the vacancies of the posts of Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, invite applications from all eligible candidates as also recommendations and references from all stakeholders, including the members of the Bar, Bar Associations, sitting and retired Judges, leaders of political parties and NGOs, which will ensure a large pool from which selection of Judges could be made, diametrically opposite to the small pool of kith and kin of Judges and those mostly connected with the Judges who constitute the collegium, as is the present practice, notify the names and particulars of the candidates who are found eligible and selected, invite objections, if any, from public at large so that appointments in terms of Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution of India are made possible, even while retaining the mechanism of collegium, though the Petitioner in no way endorses it, till the Constitution (121st  Amendment) Bill, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointment Commission Bill, 2014 become laws, the former having received the assent of majority of the States;
iii.            issue a writ in the nature of prohibition or any other appropriate writ, order or direction restraining and prohibiting the collegium of the Supreme Court of India headed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India; so too the collegiums of the High Courts headed by their respective Chief Justices from making recommendation for appointment to the august office of the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts in the cabal manner, as is the present case, without notification of the vacancies by advertisement and inviting applications from all eligible candidates, references and recommendations from the Members of the Bar, Bar Associations, sitting and retired Judges and the public at large and without making public the names of the candidates who are selected and further to restrict and prohibit the Union of India from proceeding upon the recommendations, if any, under process, one rendered in a cabal manner, till the Constitution (121st  Amendment) Bill, 2014 is ratified by majority of the States and becomes a law; so too the National Judicial Appointment Commission Bill, 2014;

1.                       While the said Writ Petition was pending, the NDA Government  in terms of the promise made by it in its election manifesto of an open and transparent selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, brought in the Constitution (121st  Amendment) Bill, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointment Commission Bill, 2014.  The said Bills were passed by both the Houses of the Parliament, received the assent of the President of India on 31st December, 2014 and became the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointment Commission Act, 2014 (the Acts, for short).  However, they were not notified.  The Petitioner accordingly instituted Writ Petition No.124/2015 in the Supreme Court seeking a mandamus to the Union of India to notify the said Acts, frame rules and thereby make open and transparent selection and appointment of Judges, allowing the long cherished dream of the people a reality.

4.      In the meanwhile, certain first class lawyers, the so-called legal luminaries, mesmerized the people of this country and ordinary lawyers to believe that a judgment of the Supreme Court in a case between A and B is not merely a precedent when a case between C and D involving the same issues, but is the “law of the land”; that it is not the Parliament which declares the law of the land, but the Supreme Court, and filed petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution titling them as PILs, which later came to be known as the NJAC case.PIL as envisaged by the legendary Judges like P.N. Bhagwati, Y.V. Chandrachud, V.R. Krishna Iyer et al, only meant that where a person whose constitutional and legal rights are infringed and who out of his poverty, ignorance, illiteracy and other disadvantages is unable to approach a constitutional Court, any person acting pro bono publico can, without any express authority from the person aggrieved, act on his behalf.  PIL only meant relaxation of the concept of locus standi to make justice delivery system accessible to the poor, illiterate and such others.  However, the PIL had been castigated to be a “ravenous wolf in sheep's clothing” by none other than legendary Krishna Iyer, one of the very architects of the said benevolent jurisprudence.  Thus, though PIL was not meant to be a device to substitute the executive and legislature by Courts and the Courts to act as if it is the executive, legislature and judiciary, all at once, the legal luminaries and some among them, who are accused of running a Rs.500 crore PIL industry, hypnotized the people of this country and ordinary lawyers and made them to think otherwise.
5.      To invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, there must be a “person aggrieved”.  One could be said to be a person aggrieved where his fundamental rights are infringed.  The Acts in question, the Petitioner begs to submit, cannot be said to infringe the fundamental rights of anyone, for, the said enactments are enactments in the realm of executive and legislative policy, which are wholly non-justiciable.  Yet, the Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association (SCAORA) instituted a Writ Petition under Article 32 seeking a declaration that the said Acts are unconstitutional without a plea that their or their members’ fundamental rights are violated.  The learned Advocate General was duty bound to raise the plea of non-maintainability of the said Writ Petition, for, to repeat, for maintenance of a PIL there must be a person aggrieved and SCAORA and the Bar Association of India, the Petitioners in the Writ Petitions, have not stated who is the person aggrieved;  that the only persons who can be said to be aggrieved are the Judges of the High Courts and the Supreme Court who could be said to be invested with a legitimate expectation, an equitable right, for elevation as a Judge of the Supreme Court or as the Chief Justice of a High Court, but they were not Petitioners in the Supreme Court; that SCAORA and the Bar Association of India have not made any assertion that the said Writ Petitions were instituted on behalf of such Judges who could not have, on their own, instituted them for enforcement of their fundamental rights; and that the controversy raised in the said Writ Petitions were in the realm of executive and legislative policy and therefore not justiciable.  The learned Attorney General, like his predecessors in 1981, 1993 and 1998, by failing to raise the fundamental plea that the challenge to the said Acts is not maintainable, invited the judgment dated 16th October, 2015 at the hands of the Five-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court holding that the said Acts are unconstitutional.

6.       “Brevity is the soul of wit”, said Shakespeare.  The Petitioner begs to submit that the Five-Judge Constitution Bench in NJAC case (WP(C) No.13/2015 with WP(C) No.124/2015, JT 2015 (10) SC 1), took notice of the fact that the collegium system has failed; that it is imperative to improve it and exhorted that it is time for “glasnost” (openness) and “perestroika” (restructuring), and accordingly it invited suggestions from Bar Associations, legal luminaries and the ultimate stakeholders, the public at large.  The public at large responded to the call of the Supreme Court in an overwhelming measure, though they were given only a few days and that too in the midst of the 2015 Diwali Holidays to submit their opinions and suggestions in the realm of (i) Transparency, (ii) Collegium Secretariat   (iii) Eligibility Criteria and (iv) Complaints. With utmost respect the Petitioner begs to submit that the Supreme Court realized that inviting suggestions from the public is in the realm of legislation, though it did not expressly say so, and when opinions and suggestions running into 15,000 pages from thousands of people are received it is impossible to decide which opinion should be accepted or rejected.  A copy of the main judgment is not produced and the Petitioner begs to refer to it since it has been reported in JT 2015 (10) SC 1.  A copy of the order dated 05.11.2015 by which suggestions from the public was sought is produced as Annexure P-1 page at (         45 to 52)

7.      As to be reminded of the words of Horace, parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus, the Supreme Court, the Petitioner salutes its sagacity and wisdom in realizing that the task of inviting opinions and suggestions from the public at large as to the ways and means by which the collegium system could be improved and acting upon those suggestions is too cumbersome/onerous, by order dated 16.12.2015 directed the Government of India to prepare a Memorandum of Procedure for appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary in consultation with the CJI.  A copy of the order dated 16.12.2015 is produced as Annexure P-2 page at (53 to 68).

8.      The aforesaid Acts, by which a mechanism for appointment of Judges of the higher judiciary by NJAC in substitution of the collegium system, which has failed entirely and has resulted in oligarchy, corruption and nepotism, were held to be unconstitutional by the judgment dated 16th October, 2015.  The NJAC was aborted and the collegium system is restored.  The Government has not filed any petition seeking review of the said judgment.  The only review petition is the one which has been filed by the Petitioner.  The Petitioner in all humility concedes that he is so inconsequential that his efforts to secure a review of the judgment dated 16th October, 2015 and restore the NJAC is a near impossibility.  The Petitioner, therefore, considers that it is only prudent on his part to accept the burial of the NJAC as a fait accompli and to pursue some other feasible means to secure the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution a reality. Hence this writ petition.

9.      The august offices of the Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts are public offices of great esteem and sanctity.  Every lawyer, nay, every citizen of this country, who satisfies the qualifications and criteria prescribed under Articles 124(3) & 217(2) of the Constitution, is entitled to aspire for selection and appointment to the said posts, and to be selected and appointed if the authorities invested with such function find him eligible and suitable.  The Petitioner begs to submit that he commits no crime in harbouring a thought that there should exist a system where he could also apply for and be selected and appointed as a Judge, if eligible, and whether he is eligible or suitable ought to be determined by certain eligibility criteria or standard prescribed.  It is the duty of the authority invested with the power to make selection and appointment that it makes such appointment in an open, transparent, non-arbitrary, just and fair manner so that not merely the Petitioner but hundreds and thousands of lawyers across the breadth and width of the country, who consider themselves to be eligible for the post, are not denied of their fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

10.  The judgment dated 16th October, 2015 recognizes and holds that certain rules or regulations ought to be made in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges of the higher judiciary and accordingly invited suggestions and opinions from the public at large identifying or confining to four core areas, namely, (i) Transparency, (ii) Collegium Secretariat, (iii) Eligibility Criteria and   (iv) Complaints.  If rules and regulations or Memorandum of Procedure, no matter by what name it is known, no matter whether it is statutory or non-statutory or merely executive, it is absolutely necessary that its draft so made is made known to the public at large.  The Petitioner is aged 57 years.  Assuming that the age limit is fixed at 55 years, he may have a grievance.  Assuming that the age limit is kept at 60 years, he may not have any grievance.  But the Memorandum of Procedure unfailingly ought to prescribe the eligibility criteria, including the upper and lower age limit, the income limit, though the Petitioner has serious reservations  in fixing any income limit, etc.  The most pointed accusation against the collegium system of appointment is that it is absolutely cabal, which meant the exalted office of the Judges of the higher judiciary being literally monopolized by the kith and kin of Judges, and the vast majority of lawyers who have no connections with the members of the collegium are left out; they do not even come to know that vacancies of Judges are being filled up. The word “invitation” is the most scandalous one, for, it has meant only the kith and kin of sitting and former Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, celebrated lawyers, et al being invited to occupy the august office.  In other words, the greatest demand of the legal fraternity, the civil society, the public at large, is that vacancies in the office of the Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts be notified, invitations and references from all eligible be called for, the selection procedure should be made wholly transparent, minutes of the proceedings of the collegium be open to the public and in particular through the Right to Information Act.  The order dated 16.12.2015 by which the Constitution Bench directed the Government of India to frame a Memorandum of Procedure in consultation with the CJI has not given any directions even in the realm of notifying the vacancies and inviting applications/references from eligible candidates.  The Petitioner is an ordinary Advocate; he has no connections with the higher ups; he knows nothing about what happens in the higher echelons of power.  But he is made to understand that the Ministry of Justice, which has formulated or is formulating the Memorandum of Procedure, is in favour of  notification of the vacancies to the legal fraternity, nay, the public at large, and invitation of applications/ references from members of Bar Associations and general public, though at the hearing of the NJAC case the learned Attorney General, time and again, reiterated that the Government is in favour of advertisement of vacancies and open selection; so too total openness of the method of selection and appointment, and make the Right to Information Act,2005 applicable to it. The petitioner, along with M/s. R.P. Luthra, A.K.De, A.C.Philip, Anjan Sinha, et all , members of the National Lawyers’ Campaign for Judicial Transparency and Reforms met the Hon’ble Minister of law and justice, seeking appropriate steps at the hands of the Government to undo the great public injury which the judgment of the Supreme Court in NJAC case constitute to be and in particular, to the members of the legal fraternity, nay the posterity or the generations of the lawyers to come, of equal opportunities in the matter of elevation to the office of the judges of the High Courts and Supreme Court which undoubtedly is high constitutional public offices, of which all citizens are entitled to have an equal opportunity under Article 16 of the Constitution.  The petitioner received a communication dated 23.02.201 from the ministry of Law and Justice on this.  The legal fraternity, nay, the public at large, is kept in total darkness as to the ways and means by which the collegium system could be improved, which should reflect in the Memorandum of Procedure which is said to be under discussion with the CJI.  The Petitioner is made to understand that the Memorandum of Procedure has failed to translate the need of the hour, namely, “glasnost” and  “perestroika”, which will be achieved only if the following are incorporated in the Memorandum of Procedure in unmistakable terms:-
(i)           Notification of vacancies;
(ii)          Invitation of applications from lawyers who are considered to be eligible; so also references from Bar Associations, lawyers and even public at large as to whom they consider to be eligible and deserving;
(iii)         Short-listing of applications/references so received;
(iv)         Notify to the legal fraternity and the public at large the names which are short-listed;
(v)          Provide for a mechanism for dealing with complaints against the names short-listed;
(vi)         Provide for the composition of the Collegium Secretariat;
(vii)        Give access to documents/minutes of the collegium, including application of Right to Information Act,2005 as well.

11.  It is possible that the apprehensions expressed by the Petitioner above that the Government is not considering inclusion of the above points in the Memorandum of Procedure, that the Memorandum of Procedure under preparation or which has already been prepared means no tangible improvement of the collegium system, which was condemned by all, may not be true, for, for the Petitioner cannot claim any sanctity to his source of information, in which case this Writ Petition may become infructuous and the Petitioner will have to seek leave of this Hon'ble Court to withdraw the same.  If, on the contrary, what the Petitioner has heard from informal, not so reliable sources, is true and the collegium system is restored without any improvement with no amount of “glasnost” and  “perestroika” and the same continues to be the cabal system as before, then the Petitioner is entitled to seek a mandamus at the hands of this Hon'ble Court directing the Government of India to incorporate in the Memorandum of Procedure the requirements enumerated above, which will make the collegium system transparent and will afford an opportunity to all those who are eligible and deserving to apply for the post of Judges of the higher judiciary.
12.  The petitioner is leading a national campaign titled “the national lawyers campaign for judicial transparency and reforms’’ to secure greater Transparency and Accountability in the higher judiciary. The campaign has as its primary agenda to strive for, leaving no stones unturned, to secure an open and transparent selection and appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts. Accordingly, a delegation of the lawyers Campaign met the Hon’ble union law minister on 16th of February 2016 demanding that the Government of India should seek a review of the judgement of this court in the NJAC. Suffice is to say that the irresistible impression which the Hon’ble Minister, who entertained the delegation which was led by this humble petitioner, so too, M/S. R.P.Luthra and A.K.Dey, was that the Government of India is committed to the cause of greater transparency and accountability in higher judiciary.
13.  Considering the larger issue, the Petitioner, has instituted, the instant Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before this Hon’ble Court, on the following amongst other :-

GROUNDS
A.          The judgment dated 16th October, 2015 in WP(C) No.13/2015 with WP(C) No.124/2015, (JT 2015 (10) SC 1) declaring the Acts as unconstitutional is void inasmuch as the said judgment impinges the basic structure of the Constitution; it is one rendered without jurisdiction and in violation of the principles of natural justice since this Hon'ble Court happened to assume to itself the jurisdiction to embark upon an inquiry as to whether or not the wisdom of the Parliament, and that too in absolute unanimity, except a sole Member in the Rajya Sabha, and ratified by more than 20 States, is questionable or not.  This Hon'ble Court happened to do so since the learned Attorney General conceded, as has been recorded in paragraphs 75 and 76 of the lead judgment at the hands of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Khehar, that the challenge raised by the Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association (SCAORA) and others “could only be accepted, if it was shown, that the Parliament while exercising its plenary power to amend the Constitution, had violated the ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution.”  At the cost of repetition, it may be stated that in paragraph 76 of the judgment it was recorded that it has been asserted by the learned Attorney General that “the only scope for examination with reference to the present constitutional amendment was, whether while making the aforestated constitutional amendment, the Parliament had breached, any of the ‘basic features’ of the Constitution.”
B.           The entire challenge to the Acts made in the Writ Petitions filed by SCAORA and others was founded on the spacious premise that independence of judiciary is one of the basic structure of the Constitution and in so far as the said Acts while enacting for NJAC, a mechanism where under Judges will have no absolute monopoly in the selection, appointment and transfer of Judges, will amount to impingement of the independence of the judiciary, one of the most inalienable, transcendental and primordial basic feature of the Constitution.  Stated in the simplest of simple words, the challenge to the Acts was on the sole premise that independence of judiciary is at peril, nay, the basic structure of the Constitution will be impinged; nothing more, nothing less. 
C.          The doctrine of basic structure has its foundation in the judgment of the Full Court of this Hon'ble Court in Kesavananda Bharati v. the State of Kerala (1973) Supp. SCR 1.  In Kesavananda Bharati, the constitutionality of the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971 and Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 was challenged on the premise that the said amendments are violative of Part III of the Constitution, a Chapter which deals about fundamental rights, of which the most pertinent is Article 13 of the Constitution which declares that all pre-existing laws in so far as they are in conflict with, so too all post-Constitution laws in so far as they take away or abridge the rights conferred under Part III of the Constitution, are void.  In Kesavananda Bharati the plea that the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971 and the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 be declared to be void because they violated the fundamental rights was not accepted.  The said judgment, however, held that though fundamental rights could be impinged by virtue of a Constitution amendment, such impingement cannot be an absolute one, one which would totally take away or eliminate the lives and liberties of citizens which are so sacrosanct and could be construed to be the soul of the constitutional ethos.  This Hon'ble Court while explaining the proposition that the Parliament in exercise of its constituent power is competent to curtail or limit the fundamental rights, keeping in mind the directive principles of State policy, which has an equal position of prominence in the constitutional scheme, held that it still shall not be entitled to exercise its power of amendment in such a fashion as to totally destroy or emasculate the Constitution or replace it with another.  However, the doctrine of basic structure, on the very face of it a proposition which none could find fault with, for, in Kesavananda Bharati, so too in subsequent judgments of this Hon'ble Court, it was held that republican democratic form of Government, Federal structure of the Constitution, separation of powers, secularism, independence of judiciary, all, constitute to be the basic structure of the Constitution, lost sight of the fact that the doctrine of basic structure no way expands the horizons of the concept of justiciability. Kesavananda Bharati invoked the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for enforcement of his fundamental right.  The Supreme Court held that the Constitution amendment, which was challenged, was valid, but it further held that the Parliament even in exercise of its constituent amendment cannot take away or completely destroy the fundamental rights. 
D.          The doctrine of basic structure in itself is not justiciable.  Nobody could ever imagine to be invested with the right to come to a Court and seek a declaration that a Constitution amendment or an Act of Parliament is void since he perceives that the amendment or the Act impinges the basic structure.  He or she needs to plead something more, namely, that his or her fundamental rights are violated and the amendment or the Act which has violated his or her fundamental rights is so drastic or illegal that it not merely impinges his or her fundamental rights but it completely destroys them.  There thus a violation of the basic structure of the Constitution and the Parliament in exercise of its constituent power is not empowered to enact such a law can be pleaded.  Stated pithily, before and after Kesavananda Bharati, to challenge the constitutional validity of a Constitution amendment or an ordinary legislation there must exist a person aggrieved and the person aggrieved must complain that by virtue of the amendment or the legislation his fundamental right is violated.  Kesavananda Bharati has, in fact, contrary to the public perception, made the challenge on the ground of violation of fundamental rights difficult, rather than easier.  Kesavananda Bharati permits some curtailment of fundamental rights.  The only bar is that such curtailment shall not be so drastic that it will completely destroy the fundamental rights itself, for, the fundamental rights constitute to be an inalienable, transcendental and primordial basic feature of the Constitution.  The Petitioner begs to submit with utmost respect that in Kesavananda Bharati the Hon'ble Judges went on to discuss the concept of basic structure of the Constitution beyond what was required, which made the seeds of total misconception of the said judgment blossom in the years to come.  In certain other judgments, namely, Minerva Mills v. Union of India  (1980) 2 SCC 591, Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2014) 10 SCC 1 and the NJAC case too, the fact that the concept of basic structure was evolved with reference to a plea for enforcement of fundamental rights was completely lost sight of and a new jurisdiction founded on sand that a challenge to the constitutionality of a Constitution amendment or an ordinary Act of Parliament will lie without there in existence a person aggrieved and he claiming violation of his fundamental rights by virtue of the Constitution amendment or the Act of Parliament, as in the instant case.
E.                    Since the question of the non-maintainability of the above Writ Petitions, nay, the question of the constitutionality of the Acts on the premise that it violates the basic structure without there in existence a plea that the fundamental rights of SCAORA and other Petitioners have been violated by virtue of the said Acts, which the Petitioner raised, happened to be, the Petitioner begs to submit with utmost respect, not taken notice of by this Hon'ble Court, since the Petitioner did not receive any support from the learned Attorney General or the Solicitor General, though had the said plea been supported by them and was taken to its logic end, this Hon'ble Court would not have rendered the judgment in question holding the said Acts as unconstitutional and void, being violative of the basic structure of the Constitution.  The learned Attorney General and the Solicitor General, by failing to raise the fundamental issue of non-justiciability of the said Acts without there in existence anyone claiming or complaining that his or her fundamental right is violated and such violation amounts to infringement of the basic structure of the Constitution within the meaning of Kesavananda Bharati, have, the Petitioner begs to submit with utmost respect, “invited” this Hon'ble Court to go into and examine the wisdom of the Parliament in enacting the Acts and substitute its/ Court’s wisdom with that of the Parliament by holding that there is no wisdom in enacting the Acts.  The failure/refusal to support the plea of non-maintainability of the Writ Petitions by the learned Attorney General and the Solicitor General was probably the most important factor which has led the said Acts being struck down at the hands of this Hon'ble Court and this Hon'ble Court, with utmost respect, substituting the wisdom of the Parliament with its own judgment  and rewriting of the Constitution, nay, endorsing the rewriting of the Constitution by virtue of the judgments in Judges-2 and Judges-3 cases. 
F.                    Sublato fundamento, cadit opus – the foundation being removed, the structure falls.  This Hon'ble Court had no jurisdiction at all to entertain the plea on the challenge to the Acts.  To repeat, the said Acts are legislations on constitutional policy in the matter of appointment of Judges, which is not justiciable at all.  The learned Attorney General and the Solicitor General failed to raise the plea of non-maintainability of the Writ Petitions, for, no Writ Petition under Article 32 could be filed unless the party invoking the said jurisdiction claims violation of his or her fundamental rights.  It was their duty while representing the Government, nay, the 125 crores people of this country, to assert that neither SCAORA nor the Bar Association of India, nay, none of the Petitioners who had challenged the validity of the Acts, has claimed that their fundamental rights are infringed; that no Writ Petition under Article 32 could have been maintained without such a plea; that the PIL is wholly not maintainable inasmuch as for maintenance of a PIL there ought to be a person aggrieved and the person aggrieved out of his poverty, ignorance, illiteracy and other similar disadvantages is unable to approach this Hon'ble Court.  It was the duty of the learned Attorney General and the Solicitor General to point out that, where there is no person aggrieved in existence whose fundamental or legal rights are said to have been infringed, no lis exists and no Writ Petition under Article 32 could be filed.  In other words, the Writ Petitions are upon the validity of a law which provided for a new mechanism for appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, which is in the realm of legislative or executive policy and which by no stretch of imagination could be said to involve violation of any fundamental rights of any of the Petitioners and, admittedly, none has claimed such violation.  It was the duty of the learned Attorney General and the Solicitor General to have pointed out that nobody could ever come to the Supreme Court alleging that if a mechanism as under the impugned Acts is created for appointment of Judges and where Judges are appointed in terms of the said mechanism, the Judges so appointed would be subservient to the executive, that they will ever remain loyal to the executive Government, and that the person who has instituted or may have reason to institute a legal proceeding in the High Court or supreme Court in future will not get fair justice and thereby his fundamental right is violated because the Judges appointed under the NJAC will remain loyal to the executive Government who had a role in their appointment.  No person whose sanity cannot be put to question will ever venture to make such a plea and the Petitioners who have challenged the Acts have not, thankfully, made any such plea in their petitions or in the arguments by the distinguished of the distinguished counsel in the country engaged by them.
G.                   The judgment of this court  dated 16.10.15 which is sought to be declared as violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioner and thus unconstitutional  in fact is the Judges-5 case, though popularly known as the Judges-4 case, which has struck down the Acts and restored the collegium, a mechanism whereunder the Judges appoint themselves.  The Petitioner may be forgiven in putting it bluntly that the said judgment is nothing but entering into the act of legislation as if the Supreme Court is the Parliament, nay, in substitution thereof.  By the instant judgment, the judgment in Judges-2 case, which is nothing but rewriting of the Constitution, a judgment rendered per incuriam and which is void ab initio, is restored.  The net effect of the judgments in Judges-2, Judges-3 cases and the current case is literal death of democracy, the unkindest cut of the concept of separation of power at its very root, the Court assuming the role of both the Parliament and the executive, all at once, as if it is the Parliament and the executive, nay, in substitution thereof.  The judgments in Judges-2 and Judges-3 cases and the above petitions have resulted in a ridiculous scenario where Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution are to be read diametrically opposite to what they state, which has meant cutting the concept of judicial review at its very root.  The question which now arises and for which no satisfactory answer could ever be offered is that if the Court were to act as the executive and the legislature, where will a person aggrieved, who intends to seek judicial review of the executive or legislative action, go to seek remedy.  It is not the Acts which impinge the so-called holy cow, the basic structure, but it is the judgments in Judges-2 and Judges-3 cases and in the above petitions which have caused the severest blow and irreparable damage to the concept of basic structure.
H.                   The concept of basic structure is wholly misunderstood.  It has been detailed above, but at the cost of repetition it is submitted that nobody could ever be heard to invoke Article 32 on the premise that the basic structure of the Constitution is impinged.  He has to come with a plea that the Constitution amendment or an ordinary law, whatever be it, results in violation of his fundamental rights and the violation is so grave, is so fundamental, that it is beyond the permissible domain of abrogation of the fundamental rights that so long as the Constitution remains it cannot be allowed to happen.  Unless there is such a plea, no writ under Article 32 will lie.  The Writ Petitions by SCAORA and the Bar Association of India and others, so too the National Tax Tribunal case and the innumerable PILs where busy bodies assume the role of the Attorney General and speak of public interest are all instituted on a misconception of the doctrine of basic structure and the concept of PIL.
I.                      This Hon'ble Court listed the above petitions on 3rd November, 2015 to device ways and means by which the collegium system could be improved.  With utmost respect, the Petitioner begs to submit that the said exercise has no foundation in jurisprudence, nay, constitutional law.  This Hon'ble Court in doing so acted as if it is the Parliament exercising its constituent/legislative power.  Nobody could deny that Supreme Court today is a fortress.  An ordinary lawyer finds it difficult to get entry; passes are restricted; no pass is issued to the general public unless he is able to show that he has a case listed; assuming that a lawyer or litigant who is interested in partaking in the deliberations of this Hon'ble Court on 3rd November, 2015, he will not be able to enter the Court Hall and if he is able to do so, he will not be heard.  Distinguished of the distinguished lawyers, with utmost respect and with an apology the Petitioner begs to submit, have monopolized the right to audience.  The Petitioner with more than 31 years at the Bar, pursuing his Writ Petition with great amount of zeal and fire, found himself difficult to be heard.  The Petitioner was not heard in any meaningful way.  Had he been heard and allowed to raise the question of justiciability of the issue, elaborated above, the judgment in question would not have been delivered. The course of history would have been different.  The plea of non-maintainability and non-justiciability is so important and even if it were to be rejected, it ought to have been allowed to be argued and was required to be rejected by giving reasons.  The judgment of this Hon'ble Court running into more than 1000 pages is silent about it since this Petitioner was not really heard.  When a party to a proceeding was not heard, the judgment becomes null and void.
J.            The judgment dated 16th October, 2015 is void ab initio since the Constitution Bench was disqualified from hearing the case.  When a Constitution Bench was first constituted with Hon'ble Mr. Justice Anil R. Dave as the Presiding Judge, the Petitioner had to seek His Lordship’s recusal with a heavy heart and great amount of hesitation, but he did so because he felt that it was his duty to do so. Thereafter the Constitution Bench was reconstituted with Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.S. Khehar, one of the most respected, distinguished and erudite Judges with heavenly qualities, as the Presiding Judge.  The Petitioner had to seek His Lordship’s recusal since he felt that if the Constitution Bench were to strike down the Acts and give a new lease of life to the collegium system, then His Lordship, the Petitioner begs to submit with utmost and great hesitation would be seen to have, though wholly unwittingly it could be, struck down the Acts and given rebirth to the collegium system, which was interred with its bones by virtue of the impugned Acts, and becoming a member of the powerful collegium which appoints Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts.  The fundamental principle, namely, nemo iudex in sua causa or nemo debet esse judex in propria causa - no one can be judge in his own cause – stands violated.  It is a fundamental principle that where a Judge is biased, even where such bias is non-conscious, sub-conscious or unconscious, as in the instant case where His Lordship Hon'ble Mr. Justice Khehar would not have even in the wildest of his dreams ever thought of himself being a member of the collegium writing a judgment so as to secure a place for himself.  With utmost respect, nay, with greater amount of hesitation, the Petitioner begs to submit that had NJAC been in place, which certainly would have been the position but for the judgment sought to be reviewed, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Khehar as of today would not have any role in the appointment and transfer of Judges, but since the NJAC is, if the Petitioner were to borrow an expression from Shakespeare, “interred with its bones” by virtue of the said judgment and since by a stroke of a pen the Constitution Bench could do so and resurrect the collegium system, which is universally castigated to be an opaque and non-transparent one, His Lordship Hon'ble Mr. Justice Khehar is part of the collegium and His Lordship has a pre-eminent role in the appointment and transfer of Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts.  The Petitioner is afraid to say that an “informed onlooker”, nay, even an ordinary man, nay, the 125 crores people of this country, may consider the judgment rendered by this Hon'ble Court as void, being in conflict with the maxim nemo potest esse simul actor et judex – “no one can be at once suitor and Judge”.
K.          The doctrine of nemo debet esse judex in propria causa – no one can be judge in his own cause – is equally applicable for the entire Constitution Bench which heard the above petitions.  It is incorrect to say that the plea of recusal made by the Petitioner was confined to Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dave and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Khehar.  The Petitioner tendered in the open Court a chart showing that a Bench of not nine but eleven Hon'ble Judges, who will never be a part of the collegium nor of the NJAC, for, they will superannuate before they could reach that position by virtue of seniority, could have been constituted.  The judgment at the hands of the entire Bench is, therefore, vitiated by violation of the first principle of natural justice, namely, nemo debet esse judex in propria causa, and is liable to be declared as void.
L.           The only saving grace in the aforesaid judgment is acceptance of the fact of total lack of transparency, opaqueness, oligarchy, nepotism and all sorts of vices where sunlight, which is the greatest disinfectant, is not allowed to enter is taken notice of by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kurian Joseph quite eloquently in his judgment, concurring though, so too by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jasti Chelameswar, and the willingness of the Constitution Bench to further the case on the question of ways and means by which the collegium system could be improved.  The collegium is incapable of being improved, for, its shortcomings are so fundamental and incurable.  The Petitioner considers that the following steps could go a long way in making the working of the collegium system far better.  They are:
M.         Creation of a Secretariat/Commission under the administrative control of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justices of the High Courts, which is provided with all facilities, infrastructure, requisite finance, and empowered to act as a Judicial Appointment Commission.  Such Commission should be brought under the purview of the Right to Information Act, 2005 and it should conduct its business transparently;
N.          The Commission should notify the vacancies of Judges in the Supreme Court and High Courts at least six months before the vacancies occur.  Notification of the vacancies should also provide for filling up of the same by open selection for which the first step is to invite applications from all eligible candidates, invite references from all stakeholders, the Bar Associations, the public at large, of whom they consider to be most suitable.  The collegium/Commission should fix the qualifications and the minimum and upper age limit.  Though the Constitution has prescribed the qualification as 10 years of practicing as a lawyer or as a Judge, the collegium/Commission appointed by the collegium could fix it to be 15 years.  The minimum age limit could be fixed at 45 years and the maximum at 55.  In case the number of applications is too large, then the collegium/ Commission should fix a further standard for screening/short-listing the candidates.  When it comes to the competence and experience of lawyers who have applied for and could be considered for appointment, it could be possible that it may vary from State to State because there can be no match for the lawyers practicing in Delhi, Mumbai etc., with those practicing in far off High Courts, without meaning any belittling the lawyer fraternity of any Bar.  The zone of selection need not be confined to the Bar of a particular High Court.  Appointing a lawyer of a North Indian High Court in a South India High Court and vice-versa will not only foster greater national integration, but also will mean an answer to the complaints of favouritism and nepotism, which is so widespread.  Whether a Secretariat/Commission for each High Court or a common selection Secretariat at the national level under the command of the collegium of the Supreme Court is a matter which by a method of “trial and error” alone can tell.  However, currently a mechanism of State level Secretariat could be thought of.
O.          Once the candidates are short-listed for selection, which ideally should be double the number of vacancies, the short-listing should be made known to the Bar and the public at large so that opinions in favour and against could be received and the collegium can take a final call.  Though the open and transparent method of selection, as aforesaid, is likely to offer some difficulty, for, it could be possible that lawyers who have a flourishing practice may consider it embarrassing to be put to public scrutiny.  Such inhibitions are all likely to vanish into thin air once it is accepted that in a constitutional democracy, appointments to the august office of the Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts cannot be made in an opaque and cabal manner.  Viewed from another angle, a lawyer who is willing to subject himself to public scrutiny, a lawyer who has nothing to hide and no skeleton to be tumbled out of his cupboard, alone should be appointed as a Judge.  Like the Caesar’s wife, a Judge should be above suspicion.
14.  That the Petitioner have no other alternative efficacious remedy except by moving the present writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner has instituted a number of writ petitions dwelling on the same or substantially same subject matter involving the same or substantially same cause of action. However in none of the said writ petitions namely diary No.__/2014 and Writ Petition NO. 124/2015 the issues which the petitioner sought to canvas in the instant writ petition has been adjudicated. The instant writ petition is not barred by the doctrine of estoppels res judicata. The petitioner has filed a petition for the review of the judgment of this court in WP(C) No.124/2015 being Review Petition No.1451/2016 and the same was dismissed on 16th February 2016 by a non speaking order without affording an opportunity to be heard, despite in the said review petition, all the plea was that the judgment of this court dated 16.10.2015 was one without jurisdiction being in the realm of executive/ legislative policy which are non justiciable. 

PRAYERS
It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to:
(a)                    declare that the august offices of the Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts are high constitutional public offices and every citizen of India, if eligible and competent, is, as a matter of right, entitled to aspire for selection and appointment to the same and the judgments of this Hon'ble Court in Judges-2, Judges-3 and Judges-5, namely, the majority judgment dated 16th October, 2015 in the NJAC  case [Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India and others, WP(C) No.13/2015 with WP(C) No.124/2015, (JT 2015 (10) SC 1)], in so far as they abrogate the said right, are unconstitutional and void; so too  the collegium system of selection and appointment of Judges, an offspring of the judgments in the aforesaid cases which provide for an opaque and nontransparent system where only the kith and kin of Judges, their juniors and the elite class of lawyers are appointed to the deprivation of equally deserving members of the Bar who have no chance at all to be so selected and appointed;
(b)                    declare that the judgments of this Hon'ble Court in Judges-2, Judges-3 and Judges-5, namely, the majority judgment dated 16th October, 2015 in the NJAC  case (Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India and others WP(C) No.13/2015 with WP(C) No.124/2015, JT 2015 (10) SC 1) are rendered per incuriam since the controversy “adjudicated” therein is one which is non-justiciable, the same being in the realm of matters of executive and legislative policy not involving violation of any fundamental or legal right of the petitioners in the PILs in which the said judgments were rendered;
(c)                    declare that Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution of India, as originally enacted and amended by the Constitution (Ninety Ninth Amendment) Act, 2014, continue to remain in the statute book and appointments of judges of the Supreme Court and  High Courts are liable to be made in accordance therewith and that the judgments of this Hon'ble Court in Judges-2, Judges-3 and Judges-5, namely, the majority judgment dated 16th October, 2015 in the NJAC  case (Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India and others) are liable to be declared as rendered per incuriam;
(d)                   without prejudice to prayers (a), (b) and (c) hereinabove, declare that selection and appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts cannot be made except by notifying the vacancies and inviting applications from all eligible candidates; so too references from all stakeholders, including Judges, Bar Associations, Bar Councils and the public at large, namely, in an open and transparent manner;
(e)                    issue a writ in the nature of injunction or prohibition, restraining and prohibiting Respondent Nos. 2 & 6 from making any recommendations/ appointments of Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts without notification of their vacancies and invitation of applications from all eligible candidates; so too references from all stakeholders, including Judges, Bar Associations, Bar Councils and the public at large;
f)            Pass such other order or orders as the circumstances of the case may require.
AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE PETITIONER AS IN DUTY BOUND SHALL EVER PRAY:



Judges-1 case

S.P. Gupta Vs. Union Of India & Anr.  {1982 AIR  149 = 1982(2)SCR 365 = 1981 Suppl. SCC 87 = 1981(4) SCALE 1975}

Judges-2 case

Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441

Judges-3 case

Reference By President of India Under Article 143(1) Of The ... vs Unknown
AIR 1999 SC 1= RLW 1999 (1) SC 168=1998 (5) SCALE 629= 1998 Supp 2 SCR 400
Judges-4 case
Suraz India Trust Vs. Union of India & Anr.   (2012) 13 SCC 497-B
Judges-5 case / NJAC Case
Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India and Others (JT 2015 (10) SC 1)

Petition against contempt of Court Act.By Adv.Mathews J.Nedumpara

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA
IN ITS EXTRA-ORDINARY ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. ___________OF 2016


Mathews J. Nedumpara                                                          …        Petitioner
            Versus
Union of India & Ors.                                                            …        Respondents

SYNOPSIS

                        It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that to institute a legal proceeding seeking a declaratory remedy or for enforcement of the same, no cause of action needs to exist. 

2.                     The Petitioner, who is a lawyer enrolled with the Bar Council of Kerala in 1984 and practicing since then, is leading a National Campaign which has as its prime objectives the following:-
(a)                Advertisement of vacancies of Judges of the higher judiciary, invitation of applications and references , open and transparent selection and appointment, instead of the current system of appointment by invitation where only the elite and super elite are invited, in a democratic legitimacy in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges;

(b)                Creation of a Judicial Ombudsman or such other mechanism as is contemplated in the Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2012 or the Charter/Resolution called the “Restatement of Values of Judicial Life” passed by the Supreme Court of India in its Full Court meeting held on May 7, 1997, which was ratified and adopted by Indian Judiciary in the Chief Justices’ Conference 1999 or any other meaningful mechanism where grievances against Judges could be addressed;

(c)                Audio/video-recording of proceedings of all Courts and Tribunals and in particular the Supreme Court and High Courts, which will ensure transparency and accountability;

(d)               Reintroduction of the transfer policy, which was described by the Seven-Judge Constitution Bench in Judges-1 case as a panacea for allegations of favouritism and conflict of interest where a lawyer is elevated as a Judge of the very same High Court where he has been practicing;

(e)                Bring an end to the “Uncle Judge Syndrome” by transferring Judges whose immediate relatives are practicing in the very same Court;

(f)                 Abolition of the practice of designation of Advocates as a Senior Advocates or, at least, introduction of a common dress code for all lawyers, including those who are designated as Senior Advocates;
(g)                Repeal of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, for the said Act constitutes to be the one single obstacle which has rendered freedom of speech enshrined in Article 19 of the Constitution redundant.  In none of the civil law countries, the law of contempt exists.  In England, in the 19th Century itself, contempt by scandalizing  a Court was declared to be obsolete;
(h)                Introduce a transparent mechanism in the appointment of Standing Counsel/Panel Advocates/Legal Officers for Central and State Governments, Statutory Bodies, Public Sector Undertakings etc., so that the prevailing system of nepotism, political favour etc., are brought to an end;

(i)                  Simplification of procedures to make the judiciary as an institution for the common man rather than it being meant to be for the Judges and elite lawyers.

3.                     The Petitioner submits that the jurisdiction of contempt of Court has been so widely abused, the Petitioner begs to submit, not for securing the very primary object for which the said jurisdiction has relevance, namely, to secure a free, impartial and independent administration of justice, but to silence dissent and criticism, trammeling the very foundation of a constitutional democracy, namely, the right to dissent.  Hence, the instant Writ Petition.

*******
ORIGINAL PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
                       
                        The Petitioner is An Advocate enrolled with the Bar Council of Kerala in the year 1984 and has since been in active practice in the various Courts and Tribunals of the country and, in particular, the High Courts of Bombay, Delhi and Chandigarh and the Supreme Court of India, to a limited extent.  The Petitioner is also leading a Campaign titled National Lawyers’ Campaign for Judicial Transparency and Reforms, an NGO formed solely to foster greater transparency and accountability in judiciary, in particular, the higher judiciary. The Petitioner considers the words of Blackstone that the Bar is the third estate, without in any way undermining the Press known to be the fourth estate, for the freedom of speech, the most precious of the freedoms and liberties for which the Father of the Nation led the freedom struggle and which the Founding Fathers of our Constitution considered it to be the most inalienable, transcendental and primordial basic feature of the Constitution, are in great jeopardy today.  The Petitioner, a lawyer with more than three decades of standing at the Bar, considers himself to be self-disciplined, invested with the maturity which his age and standing in the profession and the society require him to observe, which make him believe that reticence is a virtue, but, at the same time, where there is a duty to speak, silence is a crime/sin.  The Petitioner is agonized and pained that India being a liberal democracy with a Constitution which has enshrined the freedom of speech and liberties as the very fundamental rights, he is not free to speak his mind freely, for, if he does so, he could be inviting prosecution for contempt of Court and if he were to speak about certain other issues, which he ought to be entitled to speak, he may face a charge of sedition.

2.                     Lex iniusta non est lex – an unjust law is no law at all, is a standard legal maxim – said St. Augustine; so too St. Thomas Aquinas but with a rider, namely, that if the consequence flowing from disobedience of an unjust law is worse than following it, then one must observe it.  Mohammed Ali Jinnah felt that the freedom struggle should be within constitutional means, namely, not to violate the laws of the land, howsoever unjust they could be. Mahatma Gandhi also believed in the philosophy of St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, nay, even that of Chief Justice Edward Coke.  The Petitioner, who, undoubtedly, is a great admirer of Gandhian philosophy of defiance of unjust law, believes that the said option ought to be exercised only when constitutional means have totally failed.  The philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi that “a Dharma which does not meet the practical requirement of life is not dharma, but adharma”, the Petitioner believes, today is not strictly constitutional in overcoming an unjust law, though on moral principles are unquestionable and would not serve the practical requirements of today.  The struggle to foster the very fundamental freedoms and liberties, of which the freedom of speech is most paramount, has to be secured through constitutional means.  The instant Writ Petition is a humble endeavour to secure freedom of speech, the most sacrosanct of all freedoms to the Petitioner; so too to the 129 crores of people of this country.

3.                     The legal status of the Respondents is manifest from the very cause title itself.  Since in the instant Writ Petition the Petitioner is seeking a declaration that Section 2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Courts Act in so far as it defines the offence of contempt as “scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any Court”, in other words, criticizing a Judge, judgment or Court, is unconstitutional; that Section 16 of the said Act, which provides that a Judge who commits contempt of his own Court is liable to be punished like anyone else who commits contempt of Court, is applicable to the Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, and to confer it an interpretation that the said section is applicable only to members of the lower judiciary and not to Judges of the higher judiciary is contrary to the very concept of equality before law and further a mandamus at the hands of this Hon'ble Court directing the Central and State Legislatures to provide for a mechanism by which the offence of contempt could be tried and decided not by the Judges of the Court against whom the allegation is made, for, in that case, they are interested parties and, therefore, to observe the principles of natural justice, namely, nemo debet esse judex in propria causa - no one can be judge in his own cause, an independent mechanism has to be created, particularly in cases where the allegation is made against a Judge who has committed contempt of his own Court within the meaning of Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, the Union of India represented by its Secretaries in the Departments of Legal Affairs and Justice, the Chief Secretary, Government of Kerala, are necessary and proper parties; so too the Bar Council of India, the Kerala Bar Association, the Press Council of India and the Law Commission of India are necessary parties since in the instant petition the Petitioner seeks to ensure that the Contempt of Courts Act is enforced primarily to secure the purpose for which the said Act is enacted, namely, to facilitate the smooth administration of justice and not to abuse the said Act or use it as a tool to suppress fair criticism of the institution of judiciary.

4.                     To eliminate any false impression that anybody might entertain that the Petitioner and the Campaign which he leads are against Judges, the Petitioner begs to submit that he being a lawyer and the legal profession being his sole means of livelihood, the institution of judiciary is so close to his heart; he considers Courts as Temples of Justice, the Presiding Officers as deities and, as the Supreme Court has said in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149, he and his fellow lawyers as the priests thereof.  The Petitioner believes in the words of legendary Justice Krishna Iyer that the Bar is the Judge of Judges and the sanctity, efficacy and credibility of the judiciary as an institution for administration of justice, untainted, pristine, would all depend upon each and every member of the Bar.  The Petitioner is reminded of the words of Justice Sabyasachi Mukherjee in P.N. Duda v. V. P. Shiv Shankar & Ors., 1988 AIR 1208, that “To criticise a judge fairly albeit fiercely, is no crime but a necessary right.”  His Lordship added, quoting Justice Brennan of U.S. Supreme Court,  that “it is a prized privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions and this opportunity should be afforded for vigorous advocacy no less than abstract discussion.”  Lord Denning had said: “Let me say at once that we will never use this jurisdiction (contempt) to uphold our own dignity. That must rest on surer foundations. Nor will we use it to suppress those who speak against us. We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more important at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech itself."  Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court had said “Judges as persons, or Courts as institutions, are entitled to no greater immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions.”

5.                     The Petitioner begs to state at the cost of repetition that while he considers the Courts and Tribunals as sacrosanct and that their majesty, dignity and authority should in no way be allowed to be undermined, for, the very concept of rule of law, one of the pillars on which the concept of democratic polity is built, which cannot stand and be sustained unless the institution of judiciary is respected, its authority is recognized, and its orders are obeyed, at the same time considers that the same could be achieved where, again to quote Justice Jerome Frank of the U.S. Court of Appeals:

“I am unable to conceive that, in a democracy, it can never be wise to acquaint the public with the truth about the workings of any branch of government. It is wholly undemocratic to treat the public as children who are unable to accept the inescapable shortcomings of man-made institutions. The best way to bring about the elimination of those shortcomings of our judicial system which are capable of being eliminated is to have all our citizens informed as to how that system now functions. It is a mistake, therefore, to try to establish and maintain, through ignorance, public esteem for our courts.”

Chief Justice of India P.B. Gajendragadkar, while speaking for the Seven-Judge Constitution Bench in Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 (AIR 1965 SC 745, paragraph 142) had said “We ought never to forget that the power to punish for contempt large as it is, must always be exercised cautiously, wisely and with circumspection. Frequent or indiscriminate use of this power in anger of irritation would not help to sustain the dainty or status of the court, but may sometimes affect it adversely. Wise Judges never forget that the best way to sustain the dignity and status of their office is to deserve respect from the public at large by the quality of their judgments, the fearlessness, fairness and objectivity of their approach, and by the restraint, dignity and decorum which they observe in their judicial conduct.”

6.                     Brief facts of the instant case.

            (a)        These days the Petitioner appears in Courts and Tribunals in different parts of the country and in particular in Mumbai and Delhi.  He always feels proud to belong to the Kerala High Court Bar. He also takes great pride of the High Court of Kerala and the Hon'ble Judges who adorn its august office.  Only a couple of days back, in an affidavit which the Petitioner drafted, his client happened to affirm as infra:-

            “Before I part with, I will be failing in the discharge of my obligation to my lawyer if I were not to state what my lawyer told me with great amount of pride that he belongs to a Bar of which the doyen late Sivasankara Panicker gave up his glorious practice when his son Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan was elevated as a Judge of the Kerala High Court and who later adorned the august office as a Judge of this Hon'ble Court, which made my lawyer, so too every lawyer of the Kerala Bar, proud of his great tradition.”

            (b)        Till the year 1998, the Petitioner’s practice was confined to Kerala.  Nowadays he occasionally comes to his home State since his major chunk of briefs is from outside Kerala.  When the Petitioner landed at Kochi on 5.3.16, he happened to come across a news report that a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court has initiated suo motu contempt of Court proceeding against one Sri K.C. Joseph, a Minister of Cultural Affairs in the Government of Kerala, on an application at the hands of one Sri Sivankutty alleging that the Minister on his Facebook page has written as infra:-

“If the antecedents of the persons who made the comments are examined, there can be no surprise that the ‘jackal who fell in the indigo dye howls’, and he cannot be blamed.

 

The newspaper report further says that even though the Minister tendered an unconditional apology for his remark against the Hon'ble Judge, this Hon'ble Court directed him to appear before it in person on 1st March, 2016 and that on that day the Hon'ble Court, after being told about the tendering of an unconditional apology by the Minister, still did not close the case and, instead, directed him to appear before it on 10th March, 2016.

 

            (c)        Thereafter the Petitioner accessed Google and came across large volume of literature and discussions on the subject.  The petitioner is afraid to say that he was flabbergasted and shocked, nay, anguished and pained, for, an institution like this Hon'ble Court, the Hon'ble Judges of which he holds in high esteem and regard and have always taken proud to be a member of the Kerala Bar, for whom the Bench and the Bar are two sides of the same coin, has chosen to take cognizance of a matter which, he believes, ought to have been totally ignored.  In a contempt of Court proceeding, silence is a sign of strength.  Justice Oliver Wendell Homes of the American Supreme Court had said:


“Unless and until we treat judges as fallible human beings whose official conduct is subject to the same critical analysis as that of other organs of government, judges will remain members of a priesthood who have great powers over the rest of the community, but who are otherwise isolated from them and misunderstood by them, to their mutual disadvantage."

Lord Atkin, one of the greatest Judges of yesteryears, had said “…Whether the authority and position of an individual judge, or the due administration of justice, is concerned, no wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticizing, in good faith, in private or public, the public act done in the seat of justice. The path of criticism is a public way: the wrong-headed are permitted to err therein; provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism, and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered virtue; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men.”  A seven Judge Constitutional Bench of Supreme Court headed by the legendary CJI, Shri P.B Gajendragadkar in a Presidential Reference under Article 143 of the Constitution (AIR 1965 SC 745 para 142) observed thus:

‘..wise judges never forget that the best way to sustain the dignity and status of their office is to deserve respect from the public at large by the quality of their judgments, the fearlessness ,fairness and objectivity of their approach, and by the restraint , dignity and the decorum which they observe in their judicial conduct…’’

In McLeod v. St. Aubyn, 1899-AC 549 (H), it was held as follows:-

"It (contempt jurisdiction) is a summary process, and should be used only from a sense of duty and under the pressure of public necessity, for there can be no landmarks pointing out the boundaries in all cases. Committals for contempt of Court by scandalising the Court itself have become obsolete in this country. Courts are satisfied to leave to public opinion, attacks or comments derogatory or scandalous to them. But it must be considered that in small colonies, consisting principally of coloured populations, the enforcement in proper cases of committal for contempt of Court for attacks on the Court may be absolutely necessary to preserve in such a community the dignity of and respect for the Court."

            (d)       In short, as legendary Justice Krishna Iyer had said in an article on contempt “Contempt power – Cipherise its User”, the concept of contempt of Court by scandalizing it has become obsolete all over the world.  In the civil world, the Court exercises no contempt of Court power at all.  When the newspaper Observer had come out with a headline “Lord Denning is an ass”, His Lordship took no offence thereof.  Lord Denning in his delightful book “What Next in Law” had chosen to give a sub-title “Denning is an ass”.  His Lordship was not moved at all by the hostile abuse by Mr. Michael Foot.  Lord Justice Salmon said: "The right to criticise judges ... may be one of the safeguards which helps to insure their high standard of performance."   Justice Krishna Iyer is considered to be the greatest of the Judges modern India had given birth to and we are all proud that this Hon'ble Court all throughout carries his legacies, his courage for preservation of freedoms and liberties, particularly the freedom of speech.  His Lordship in his Book “Off the Bench” had another chapter titled “Contempt power – a Case of Survival after Death”.  His Lordship was against the lawless jurisprudence of contempt where judiciary is the Prosecutor and Judge, all at once, because the frequent exercise of the power of contempt would mean terrorizing the common man.

            (e)        The public at large could criticize the President of India, the Prime Minister, but he cannot utter a word even against a lowest of the judicial officer.  The power of contempt, particularly of the contempt by scandalizing the Court by criticizing it and its Judges has a very disquieting consequence.  In this country, there is no literature, no drama, no cinema, no poetry, no prose and no caricature in any shape where the judiciary, one of the most important wings of the Government, could be critically discussed and deliberated.  If Charles Dickens were born and to author, ”Bleak House”, in India, instead of U.K., there would have been umpteen number of contempt of Court proceedings against him and, the Petitioner is sure, majority of them would have been by the lawyer fraternity.  There is no other jurisprudence which has been put to so much of abuse as the “in terrorem” jurisprudence of contempt of Court; the only other jurisprudence being the jurisprudence of PIL.  The jurisprudence of PIL means the judiciary acting as the executive, legislature and judiciary, all in one at the same time, which has meant the orders of Courts, which are in the realm of executive and legislative policies, becoming the subject matter of controversy and criticism at the hands of the public at large.  Even the will of the supreme legislature, we the people, acting through their elected representatives, the Parliament and State Assemblies, in bringing into existence a mechanism for an open and transparent selection and appointment of Judges of the higher judiciary has been thwarted by means of PILs by challenge to the enactments which are not justiciable.  An Act of Parliament could be freely criticized; the concept of contempt of the Parliament became obsolete in the 18th Century, but today, in the 21st Century, the ordinary citizen cannot criticize a judgment of the Supreme Court without the fear of being hauled up for contempt of Court.

7.                     The concept of contempt of Court is a cathartic jurisprudence, which has its origin in the Canon Law and, in particular, the Canon Law of the Dark Ages, a jurisprudence of a time when the offence of heresy, nay, contempt of the Church, where the contemnor is burnt alive at a stake (a stump for tying a person to be burnt alive).  The “in terrorem” jurisprudence of contempt of Court militates against all canons of justice and fair play; it flourished in the Middle Ages where Inquisition (an organization in the Roman Catholic Church in the past that was responsible for finding and punishing people who did not accept its beliefs and practices) was the way in which justice was administered.  The guilt of the contemnor could be brought out of him by torture.  Forcible confessions would be obtained from him and he was allowed to purge himself of the contempt by confession of his guilt and apology therefor.  The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has its foundation in the jurisprudence of contempt of the Dark Ages.  Sub-Section (5) of Section 17 thereof is a classic example, which provides as follows:-
“17. Procedure after cognizance.—

(1) …   …        …
(2) …   …        …
(3) …   …        …
(4) …   …        …
(5) Any person charged with contempt under section 15 may file an affidavit in support of his defence, and the court may determine the matter of the charge either on the affidavits filed or after taking such further evidence as may be necessary, and pass such order as the justice of the case requires.”

Though scholars like William Maitland would describe contempt of Court as a jurisprudence which is sui generis, it is essentially in the realm of criminal jurisprudence.  Our constitutional and criminal laws are founded on the principle that the guilt against a person accused of an offence ought not to be wrung out of him, but has to be proved against him by other men and means.  The classical Roman lawyers described it aptly by the maxim accusare nemo se debet nisi coram deo, namely, nobody is bound to incriminate himself or nemo tenetur seipsum accusare – no one shall be compelled to bear witness against himself.  Sub-Section (5) of Section 17, quoted above, places the burden to prove his innocence upon the contemnor; it requires him to file an affidavit in support of his defence and empowers the Court to determine the matter on the affidavit of the contemnor.  Section 17(5) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, therefore, is in violation of Article 20(3) of the Constitution, which states that “no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself”; so too Articles 21, 14 and 19 thereof, which are required to be read together.

8.         In the light of the above the power of Contempt, as is presently exercised by the Hon'ble Judges of the higher judiciary is, with much respect, more susceptible to be abused than used.  The Petitioner, with much respect, has witnessed that, the power of contempt is often used against the voiceless, the outspoken and persons who are upright and choose the noble duty to speak the truth instead of committing the offense of keeping quiet when duty bound to speak. The power of Contempt, with much respect, has more than often been misused against the voices of truth, even though truth is an undeniable defence against contempt proceedings. 

9.         The incurable injury caused to a few, who are jailed, mostly the right and unpretentious officers of Court, political activists and Champions of human liberties, in the name of “scandalizing the Court” by their fair and dutiful criticism, with much respect, is nothing when compared with the damage and injury which the contempt jurisprudence has caused to the public at large.  Justice Krishna Iyer had lamented the contempt jurisdiction as a “jurisdiction in terrorem”.   Justice Ruma Pal of the Supreme Court had described it as, one of the seven deadly sins of Judges.  The recent incident where a contempt of Court proceeding was initiated against a Minister of the Kerala Government for allegedly uploading a text on his Facebook page to the effect: “If the antecedents of the persons who made the comments are examined, there can be no surprise that the ‘jackal who fell in the indigo dye howls’, and he cannot be blamed” and he being forced to appear before this Hon'ble Court twice and ultimately made to apologize has consequences far beyond the injury which I believe he has suffered.  The Contempt proceeding initiated in this particular case of the Minister is, with much respect, nothing but a blunt threat to the democratic setup of we the people.  It is an open violation of the right of fair criticism in the temperate of words. When compared to the humility of the great doyens of justice, the cognizance taken by their Lordships in the case at hand is a gross belittlement of the highly sacrosanct seat of Justice as revered by the people of Kerala; in simpler words, it is an act of Contempt of itself! 

10.                   With much respect, resorting to the power of Contempt without judicious application of judicial mind has ramifications of widest amplitude. It creates a fear, a terror, and worst, hatred, in the minds of Citizen, as, when staunch believers could criticize and question even the Almighty, His wisdom, even the “injustice” done by Him, the tax paying citizen cannot do so in respect of a Judge who is at their service, for, if they do so they will be hauled up for contempt?!  The ordinary man is terrorized to think that if that be the fate of a Minister for making reference to the story of a jackal who fell in the indigo dye, what would be his fate?  As the Petitioner has pointed out supra, the said fear has led to not venturing to write anything about the functioning of the judiciary, except eulogizing and flattery, be it by the so-called legal luminaries, for, they know that the sweetest of the voice is praise.

11.                   Justice Ruma Pal, in Her Ladyship’s article “The seven deadly sins of Judges” has spoken “I can only emphasize again that nothing destroys a judge’s credibility more than a perception that he/she decides according to closeness to one of the parties to the litigation or what has come to be described in the corridors of courts as “face value”.

12.                   The contempt of Court law, as it stands today, therefore, ought to be completely repealed; heavens are not going to fall; in the civil law countries, justice is administered in no less an efficacious manner as ours without there being a Contempt of Court law.  In the United States also, the concept of contempt by “scandalizing the Court” is non-existent; so too in most of the common law countries.  Whether the contempt of Court law should be completely repealed is for the Parliament to decide.  The Petitioner is not asking for that.  The relief which the Petitioner seeks in the instant petition is far narrower in scope.  He only seeks a declaration that the words “scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any Court” appearing in Section 2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Courts Act be declared as void because it completely abrogates the freedom of speech.  It is only profitable to extract the said Section and the Petitioner does so as infra:-

“2. Definitions –


In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires –

(a) “Contempt of court” means civil contempt or criminal contempt”
(b) “Civil contempt” means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a court.
(c) “Criminal contempt” means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which-

(d) Scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court, or …”

13.                   Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa – no one can be judge in his own cause – is a fundamental principle of law.  If a Judge is biased, he is a coram non judice.  It is well settled that a litigant has a right to seek recusal by a particular Judge, but of late a litigant is convicted for contempt of Court for seeking such recusal.  The judgment of the Supreme Court in Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India & Ors., (2014) 8 SCC 470, where it has spoken about the right/duty to hear a case, an obligation arising out of the oath to discharge the duties without fear or favour, affection or illwill, has been misunderstood to mean that where a litigant seeks recusal on the ground that the Judge could be biased and he will not get fair justice as having committed contempt.  The “in terrorem jurisdiction”, as Justice Krishna Iyer had lamented the contempt jurisdiction to be, happened to reach the dimension as aforesaid because under the said jurisdiction, judiciary is the Prosecutor and Judge, both at once.  Without meaning any disrespect to the Hon'ble Judges, we do not have a single instance where a Judge has convicted himself of committing contempt of his own Court.  The Petitioner had the privilege of coming across a few cases where conscientious Judges would blame themselves if something goes wrong in their own Court due to their own act or omissions to do an act in the discharge of his or their duty.  Justice Ralf Kohn of Michigan, USA, had come 10 minutes late for a case he was hearing.  He expressed regret in open Court and fined himself 50 Dollars. The charge to which he pleaded guilty was contempt of Court – his own Court.  It is not that we do not have such noble examples at all.  Legendary Justice Krishna Iyer is an example. So too, Justice Pendse of Bombay High Court. The Petitioner had occasion to see yet another noble soul, Hon'ble Shri Justice S.J. Vazifdar, Hon'ble Chief Justice of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, profusely apologizing if His Lordship were to ask a wrong question or if His Lordship misheard or misunderstood an argument of a counsel or had come to the Court even two or three minutes late.  The fact that we have such Judges of heavenly qualities always makes the Petitioner overwhelmed.  Nonetheless, it is a fact that Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act has never at all been used where Judges, “browbeat, bully or misbehave”, to borrow an expression of legendary Justice Krishna Iyer in “Off the Bench”, who lamented the contempt jurisdiction as “contempt zenophobia”.  The question is: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?who will guard the guards themselves or who watches the watchmen.  Section 16 can work only if there is a mechanism evolved to hear the complaint of lawyers and litigants against the “browbeating, bullying or misbehaving” at the hands of Judges.  Such a mechanism can only be evolved by the Parliament.  Hence, the Petitioner in the instant Writ Petition seeks a mandamus to the Union of India to consider the feasibility of bringing an appropriate amendment to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 to remove/delete the words “scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any Court” from Section 2(c)(i) of the said Act or substitute them with some other appropriate words.

GROUNDS

                        Grounds in support of the reliefs sought for are fairly elaborated in the statement of facts above and hence are not repeated.  The Petitioner respectfully submits that paragraphs 1 to 13 hereinabove may be read and treated as the grounds in support of the instant Writ Petition.  In addition thereto, the Petitioner begs to add that:

(A)             It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that to institute a legal proceeding seeking a declaratory remedy or for enforcement of the same, no cause of action needs to exist. 

(B)              The Petitioner submits that the jurisdiction of contempt of Court has been so widely abused, the Petitioner begs to submit, not for securing the very primary object for which the said jurisdiction has relevance, namely, to secure a free, impartial and independent administration of justice, but to silence dissent and criticism, trammeling the very foundation of a constitutional democracy, namely, the right to dissent. 

14.                   The instant Writ Petition is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata estoppel since though the Petitioner has raised some of the issues mentioned in this petition before the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Bombay, those Writ Petitions are pending, literally in the cold storage.

RELIEFS:

                        For the aforesaid grounds and those to be argued at the time of hearing, the Petitioner most respectfully prays that this Hon’ble Court be graciously pleased to:
           
(a)                declare that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is unconstitutional and void, or at least Sections 2(c)(i), 14, 16 and 17(5) thereof, since the said Sections render the freedom of speech nugatory, empower the Court to be a Judge of his own cause, make a distinction between Judges of the subordinate Courts and those of the superior Courts and permit self-incrimination/shifting the burden of proof, at least in part, on the accused/contemnor, respectively;

(b)               without prejudice to prayer (a) above and in supplemental thereof, declare that Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 does not contemplate any distinction between Judges of the subordinate Courts and those of the superior Courts, namely, of the Supreme Court and High Courts, and the concept of a Judge committing contempt of his own Court and the liability to be prosecuted and punished where a Judge commits contempt of his own Court is equally applicable to Judges of the superior Courts as in the case of the Judges of the subordinate Courts;

(c)                without prejudice to prayers (a) and (b) above, declare that sub-Section (5) of Section 17 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has to be read in consonance with Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, which provides that “no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself”; that the common law principles, namely, accusare nemo se debet nisi coram deo, namely, nobody is bound to incriminate himself or nemo tenetur seipsum accusare – no one shall be compelled to bear witness against himself – have to be read into the said Section; that the guilt of a person accused of an offence ought not to be wrung out of him, but has to be proved against him by other men and means; that he is entitled to maintain absolute silence and the burden of proof is entirely on the prosecution/accuser even if the accuser is the Court itself and that the said Section has to be construed accordingly to protect it from challenge to its constitutionality;
(d)               declare that for the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 to pass the test of Article 13 of the Constitution, namely, that it does not violate the fundamental rights and even where violation of the fundamental right is limited, such violation does not result in the destruction of the basic structure of the Constitution of which the foundational pillar is the concept of rule of law, the Parliament is duty bound to bring into existence a credible mechanism by appropriate amendments to the said Act so as to ensure that not only contempt at the hands of lawyers and litigants, nay, the public at large, are prosecuted and punished, but also contempt at the hands of Judges of all Courts irrespective of their stature, keeping particularly in mind that a contempt of Court proceeding, as any other prosecution, none  could be a Prosecutor and Judge, both at once;

(e)        pass such further and other reliefs in the nature and circumstances of the case may require.
Adv

Thursday, 10 March 2016

Intervening petition filed by NLC president Mathew J nedumpara in contempt case criminal no 192/15 pending before High Court of Kerala against Minister K. C. Joseph in a petition at the instance of V. Shivankutty MLA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

CONTEMPT OF CASE (CRIMINAL) NO 192 OF 2016

Mathews J. Nedumpara… Applicant/
    Intervener

IN THE MATTER OF:

V. Sivankutty … Petitioner

Versus

K.C. Joseph … Respondent


APPLICATION SEEKING PERMISSION TO INTERVENE IN THE ABOVE CONTEMPT OF CASE (CRIMINAL)








ADVOCATES
P.BIJIMON (B-732)
JACOB SAMUEL (J-1316)
K.T.SEBASTINAN(S-2683)
N & N LAW FIRM
210 PRASANNA VIHAR APTS,
NEAR HIGH COURT OF KERALA
COCHIN-31. PH: 0484-236873

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

CONTEMPT OF CASE (CRIMINAL) NO 192 OF 2016

Mathews J. Nedumpara… Applicant/
    Intervener

IN THE MATTER OF:

V. Sivankutty … Petitioner

Versus

K.C. Joseph … Respondent

AFFIDAVIT

I, Mathews Nedumpara, son of Joseph, aged 55, Advocate, residing at 12-F,  Harbour Heights, “A” Wing, 12th Floor, Sassoon Dock, Colaba, Mumbai–400 005, do hereby solemnly affirm and state as follows:-

1.  I am swearing this affidavit which constitutes to be evidence in support of the accompanying application seeking leave/permission of this Hon'ble Court to intervene myself in the above proceeding because I could not desist the call of my conscience.

2. These days I appear in different Courts and Tribunals in different parts of the country and in particular in Mumbai and Delhi and I always feel proud to belong to the Kerala High Court Bar. I also take great pride of the High Court of Kerala and the Hon'ble Judges who adore its august office. Only a couple of days back, in an affidavit which I drafted on behalf of a client of mine, my client happened to affirm as infra:-
“Before I part with, I will be failing in the discharge of my obligation to my lawyer if I were not to state what my lawyer told me with great amount of pride that he belongs to a Bar of which the doyen late Sivasankara Panicker gave up his glorious practice when his son Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan was elevated as a Judge of the Kerala High Court and who later adorned the august office as a Judge of this Hon'ble Court, which made my lawyer, so too every lawyer of the Kerala Bar, proud of his great tradition.”

3. Till the year 1998, my practice was confined to Kerala.  Now a days I occasionally come to my home State since my major chunk of briefs are from outside Kerala.  When I landed at Kochi on 05.03.2016, I happened to come across a news report that a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court has initiated suo motu contempt of Court proceeding against the Respondent on an application at the hands of the Petitioner alleging therein that the Respondent, a Minister of Cultural Affairs in the Government of Kerala, on his Facebook page has written as infra:-

“If the antecedents of the persons who made the comments are examined, there can be no surprise that the ‘jackal who fell in the indigo dye howls’, and he cannot be blamed.”

The newspaper report further says that even though the Respondent tendered an unconditional apology for his remark against the Hon'ble Judge, this Hon'ble Court directed him to appear before it in person on 1st March, 2016 and that on that day the Hon'ble Court, after being told about the tendering of an unconditional apology by the Respondent, still did not close the case and, instead, directed him to appear before it on 10th March, 2016.

4. Thereafter I accessed Google and came across large volume of literature and discussions on the subject.  I am afraid to say that I was flabbergasted and shocked, nay, anguished and pained, for, an institution like this Hon'ble Court, the Hon'ble Judges of which I hold in high esteem and regard and have always taken proud to be a member of the Kerala Bar, for whom the Bench and the Bar are two sides of the same coin, has chosen to take cognizance of a matter which, I believe, ought to have been totally ignored.  In a contempt of Court proceeding, silence is a sign of strength.  Justice Oliver Wendell Homes of the American Supreme Court had said:

“Unless and until we treat judges as fallible human beings whose official conduct is subject to the same critical analysis as that of other organs of government, judges will remain members of a priesthood who have great powers over the rest of the community, but who are otherwise isolated from them and misunderstood by them, to their mutual disadvantage."

Lord Atkin, one of the greatest Judges of yesteryears, had said “… no wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticizing in good faith in private or public the public act done in the seat of justice. The path of criticism is a public way : the wrongheaded are permitted to err therein: provided that members of the public abstain from 'imputing improper motives' to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken comments of ordinary men.
In McLeod v. St. Aubyn, 1899-AC 549 (H), it was held as follows:-

"It (contempt jurisdiction) is a summary process, and should be used only from a sense of duty and under the pressure of public necessity, for there can be no landmarks pointing out the boundaries in all cases. Committals for contempt of Court by scandalising the Court itself have become obsolete in this country. Courts are satisfied to leave to public opinion, attacks or comments derogatory or scandalous to them. But it must be considered that in small colonies, consisting principally of coloured populations, the enforcement in proper cases of committal for contempt of Court for attacks on the Court may be absolutely necessary to preserve in such a community the dignity of and respect for the Court."

5. In short, as legendary Justice Krishna Iyer had said in an article on contempt “Contempt power – Cipherise its User”, the concept of contempt of Court by scandalizing it has become obsolete all over the world.  In the civil world, the Court exercises no contempt of Court power at all.  When the newspaper Observer had come out with a headline “Lord Denning is an ass”, His Lordship took no offence thereof.  Lord Denning in his delightful book “What Next in Law” had chosen to give a sub-title “Denning is an ass”.  His Lordship was not moved at all by the hostile abuse by Mr. Michael Foot.  Lord Justice Salmon said: "The right to criticise judges ... may be one of the safeguards which helps to insure their high standard of performance."   Justice Krishna Iyer is considered to be the greatest of the Judges modern India had given birth to and we are all proud that this Hon'ble Court all throughout carries his legacies, his courage for preservation of freedoms and liberties, particularly the freedom of speech.  His Lordship in his Book “Off the Bench” had another chapter titled “Contempt power – a Case of Survival after Death”.  His Lordship was against the lawless jurisprudence of contempt where judiciary is the Prosecutor and Judge, all at once, because the frequent exercise of the power of contempt would mean terrorizing the common man.

6. The public at large could criticize the President of India, the Prime Minister, but he cannot utter a word even against a lowest of the judicial officer.  The power of contempt, particularly of the contempt by scandalizing the Court by criticizing it and its Judges has a very disquieting consequence.  In this country, there is no literature, no drama, no cinema, no poetry, no prose and no caricature in any shape where the judiciary, one of the most important departments of the Government, could be critically discussed and deliberated.  If Charles Dickens were born and to author Bleak House in India, instead of U.K., there would have been umpteen number of contempt of Court proceedings against him and, I am sure, majority of them would have been by the lawyer fraternity.  There is no other jurisprudence which has been put to so much of abuse as the “in terrorem” jurisprudence of contempt of Court; the only other jurisprudence being the jurisprudence of PIL.  The jurisprudence of PIL means the judiciary acting as the executive, legislature and judiciary, all in one at the same time, which has meant the orders of Courts, which are in the realm of executive and legislative policies, becoming the subject matter of controversy and criticism at the hands of the public at large.  Even the will of the supreme legislature, we the people, acting through their elected representatives, the Parliament and State Assemblies, in bring into existence a mechanism for an open and transparent selection and appointment of Judges of the higher judiciary has been thwarted by means of PILs by challenge to the enactments which are not justiciable.  An Act of Parliament could be freely criticized; the concept of contempt of the Parliament became obsolete in the 18th Century, but today, in the 21st Century, the ordinary citizen cannot criticize a judgment of the Supreme Court without the fear of being hauled up for contempt of Court.

7. I was deeply agonized and pained by the gross abuse of the jurisdiction called contempt of Court which, if at all is justified and is capable of doing public good, ought to be used sparingly.  I believe it is my duty to intervene in the above petition and bring home my concern against the abuse of the jurisdiction of contempt of Court, which, I can say in all humility and sincerity, is shared by millions of ordinary citizens of the country.  Hence, the accompanying application seeking permission to intervene in the above proceeding.

Deponent

Solemnly affirmed and signed before me by the deponent, who is personally known to me, on this the 7th day of March, 2016 in my office at Ernakulam

P.BIJIMON( B-732)
Advocate for the Applicant/Intervener

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

CONTEMPT OF CASE(CRIMINAL) NO 192 OF 2016
Mathews J. Nedumpara, aged 55
S/O Joseph, , Advocate,
residing at 12-F,  Harbour Heights,
“A” Wing, 12th Floor, Sassoon Dock,
Colaba, Mumbai–400 005,… Applicant/ Intervener

IN THE MATTER OF:

V. Sivankutty, MLA
Mullakkal Veedu
T/C 36/1241,9,Subash Nagar
Perunthanni, Thiruvananthpuram … Petitioner

Versus

K.C. Joseph, (Minister for Rural Development,
Planning and Cultutre to Government of Kerala)
Karuvelithara, Vadavathoor P.O
Kottayam- 670531
… Respondent

APPLICATION SEEKING PERMISSION TO INTERVENE IN THE ABOVE PETITION PREFERRED BY THE APPLICANT/INTERVENER THROUGH HIS COUNSEL SHRI P.BIJIMON

MAY IT PLEASE THIS HON'BLE COURT:

For the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit and those to be urged at the time of hearing, it is most humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Court be graciously pleased to:

(a)permit the Applicant/Intervener to intervene in the above contempt of case (criminal)and to be heard;

(b)pass such further and other orders as the nature and circumstances of the case may warrant.
Dated this 9th day of March, 2016.
P.BIJIMON( B-732)
Advocate for the Applicant/Intervener